John Charles Harsanyi
John Charles Harsanyi se narodil v Budapešti 29. května 1920. Po převzetí moci komunisty opustil Maďarsko a po určité době začal působit na Stanford University, kde v roce 1959 obdržel titul Ph.D. Od roku 1964 pracoval jako profesor na University of California v Berkeley. John C. Harsanyi zemřel 9. srpna roku 2000 v Berkeley, USA.
Roku 1951 uzavřel Harsanyi sňatek s Anne Klauber, se kterou emigroval z Maďarska.
Nobelovu cenu obdržel profesor Harsanyi za to, že ukázal, jak mohou být analyzovány hry s neúplnými informacemi, čímž poskytl teoretické základy pro aktivní výzkumy oblasti ekonomie informací, která analyzuje strategické situace, kdy jednotlivé ekonomické subjekty neznají cíle jiných ekonomických subjektů.
John Harsanyi vyvinul koncem 60. let přístup pro analýzu her s neúplnými informacemi hráčů, který se stal později široce používaný v celé řadě oblastí ekonomie, prakticky všude tam, kde se analýza týká informací. Tímto odstranil druhý hlavní nedostatek konceptu Nashovy rovnováhy, spočívající v předpokladu, že jednotliví účastníci hry mají úplné informace o preferencích ostatních hráčů. J. Harsanyi vyvinul metodu, jak transformovat hry s neúplnými informacemi (bayesiánské hry) na hry s úplnými informacemi, které pak mohou být analyzovány s pomocí standardních nástrojů.
John Harsanyi tvrdil, že i ty hry, kde účastníkům chybějí znalosti o strategii soupeře či soupeřů, mohou být analyzovány takřka stejně jako hry normální. Výhody samozřejmě získává ten hráč, který na rozdíl od svého rivala či rivalů disponuje potřebnými informacemi.
Kromě výzkumu v oblasti teorie her přispěl J. Harsanyi důležitým způsobem také k základům teorie blahobytu a zabýval se rovněž filozofií morálky.
Knihy
HARSANYI, J. C. Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation. With Foreword by Kenneth J. Arrow, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1976.
HARSANYI, J. C. Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1977, 314 pp. Paper-back edition, 1986. Comportamento Razionale e Equilibrio di Contrattazione, Milano, Italy: II Saggiatore, 1985. Italian translation by Simona Morini.
HARSANYI, J. C. Papers in Game Theory. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1982..
HARSANYI, J. C., SELTEN, R. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. With Foreword by Robert Aumann, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.
HARSANYI, J. C. Ľ utilitarianismo (Utilitarianism). Italian translation by Simona Morini, Milano, Italy: II Saggiatore, 1988.
HARSANYI, J. C. Morality, Equality, and Individual Excellence: A Somewhat Unorthodox Utilitarian Theory.
Články
HARSANYI, J. C. Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking. Journal of Political Economy, 61, 1953, p. 434-435.
HARSANYI, J. C. The Research Policy of the Firm. Economic Record, 30, 1954, p. 48-60.
HARSANYI, J. C. Welfare Economics of Variable Tastes. Review of Economic Studies, 21, 1953-54, p. 204-213.
HARSANYI, J. C. Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility. Journal of Political Economy, 63, 1955, p. 309-321.
HARSANYI, J. C. Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen´s, Hicks´s and Nash´s Theories. Econometrica, 24, 1956, p. 144-157.
HARSANYI, J. C. On Incentives to Decision Makers Under Uncertainty. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, 48, 1958.
HARSANYI, J. C. Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives. Mind, 67, 1958, p. 305-316.
HARSANYI, J. C. A Bargaining Model for the Cooperative n-Person Game. Ch. 17 in A.W. Tucker and R.D. Luce (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, 4 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 325-355.
HARSANYI, J. C. Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science. Behavioral Science, 5, 1960, p. 136-145.
HARSANYI, J. C. Popper´s Improbability Criterion for the Choice of Scientific Hypotheses. Philosophy, 25, 1960, p. 332-340.
HARSANYI, J. C. Theoretical Analysis in Social Science and the Model of Rational Behavior. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 7, 1961, p. 60-74.
HARSANYI, J. C. On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Cooperative Games. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5, 1961, p. 179-196.
HARSANYI, J. C. Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games. Behavioral Science, 7, 1962, p. 67-80.
HARSANYI, J. C. Measurement of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations. Behavioral Science, 7, 1962, p. 81-91.
HARSANYI, J. C. Models for the Analysis of the Balance of Power in Society. In the Proceedings of the 1961 International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962, p. 442-462.
HARSANYI, J. C. Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponent´s Utility Function. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6, 1962, p. 29-38.
HARSANYI, J. C. Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solutions in Cooperative and in Non-cooperative Games. Management Science, 9, 1962, p. 141-153.
HARSANYI, J. C. Mathematical Models for the Genesis of War (a review article on Lewis F. Richardson´s work). World Politics, 14, 1962, p. 687-699.
HARSANYI, J. C. A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game. International Economic Review, 4, 1963, p. 194-220.
HARSANYI, J. C. A General Solution for Finite Non-cooperative Games. Based on Risk-Dominance, Ch. 29, in M. Dresher, L.S. Shapley, and A.W. Tucker (eds.), Advances in Game Theory, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 651-679.
HARSANYI, J. C. Bargaining and Conflict Situations in the Light of a New Approach to Game Theory. American Economic Review, 55, 1965, p. 447-457.
HARSANYI, J. C. Some Social-Science Implications of a New Approach to Game Theory. In Kathleen Archibald (ed.), Strategic Interaction and Conflict, Berkeley, CA: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1966, p. 1-18.
HARSANYI, J. C. Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflicts. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 11, 1965, p. 292-304.
HARSANYI, J. C. A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations. Econometrica, 34, 1966, p. 613-634.
HARSANYI, J. C. A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups and Formal Organizations. Behavioral Science, 11, 1966, p. 357-369.
HARSANYI, J. C. Games with Incomplete Information Played by ´Bayesian´ Players. Part I: The Basic Model, Management Science, 14, November 1967, p. 159-182.
HARSANYI, J. C. Games with Incomplete Information Played by ´Bayesian´ Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points, Management Science, 14, January 1968, p. 320-334.
HARSANYI, J. C. Games with Incomplete Information Played by ´Bayesian´ Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game, Management Science, 14, March 1968, p. 486-502.
HARSANYI, J. C. Individualistic versus versus Functionalistic Explanations in the Light of Game Theory. In I. Lakatos (ed.), Problems in the Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1968, p. 305-321 and 327-348.
HARSANYI, J. C. Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories. World Politics, 21, 1969, p. 513-538.
HARSANYI, J. C., SELTEN, R. A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information. Management Science, 18, January 1972, Part II, p. 80-106.
HARSANYI, J. C. A Simple Probabilistic Model of Nuclear Multipolarity. Ch. 6 in R. Rosecrance (ed.), The Future of the International Strategic System, San Francisco, CA: Chandler, 1972, p. 93-102.
HARSANYI, J. C. Notes on the So-called Incompleteness Problem. Theory and Decision, 2, 1972, p. 342-352.
HARSANYI, J. C. Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points. International Journal of Game Theory, 2, 1973, p. 1-23.
HARSANYI, J. C. Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof. International Journal of Game Theory, 2, 1973, p. 235-250.
HARSANYI, J. C. An Equilibrium-point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition. Management Science, 20, 1974, p. 1472-1495.
HARSANYI, J. C. Can the Maximum Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls´s Theory. American Political Science Review, 69, 1975, p. 594-606.
HARSANYI, J. C. Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality? Theory and Decision, 6, 1975, p. 311-332.
HARSANYI, J. C. The Tracing Procedure: A Bayesian Approach to Defining a Solution for n-Person Noncooperative Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 1975, p. 61-94.
HARSANYI, J. C. A Solution Concept for n-Person Noncooperative Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 5, 1977, p. 211-225. i) Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory; ii) Liberty Under Socialism and the New Socialist Man: Comments on Dr. Cohen´s Paper; iii) The Problem Solving Ability of the Rule Utilitarian Approach Should Not Be Underestimated: Comments on Professor Scanlon´s Paper; iv) Morality and the Prisoner´s Dilemma Problem: Comments on Professor Baier´s Paper, Erkenntnis, 11, 1977, p. 25-53, 427-428, 435-438, 441-446.
HARSANYI, J. C. Time and the Flow of Information in Noncooperative Games. In H. Albach et al. (eds.), Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (Festschrift for Wilhelm Krelle), Tübingen, West Germany: J.C.B.Mohr, 1977d, 255-267. i) Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior, ii) On the Rationale of the Bayesian Approach: Comments on Professor Watkins´s Paper; iii) Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: A Rejoinder to Professor Sen. In R.E. Butts and J. Hintikka (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology andd Philosophy of Science, Part II, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1977, p. 315-343 (also in 1976 book), 381-392, 293-296.
HARSANYI, J. C. Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior. Social Research, 44, 1977, p. 623-656.
HARSANYI, J. C. Sneed on Rawls´s Theory of Social Institutions: Some Comments. Erkenntnis, 13, 1978, p. 225-230.
HARSANYI, J. C. Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics. American Economic Review, 68, 1978, p. 223-228.
HARSANYI, J. C. A Solution Theory for Noncooperative Games and Its Applications to Cooperative Games. In P.C. Ordeshook (ed.), Game Theory and Political Science, New York: New York University Press, 1978, p. 39-95.
HARSANYI, J. C. A New General Solution Concept for Both Cooperative and Noncoopeerative Games. In Papers of the Rhineland-Westphalian Academy of Sciences, 287. Opladen, West Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979, p. 7-28.
HARSANYI, J. C. Rationality, Reasons, Hypothetical Imperatives, and Morality. In Hal Berghel et al., Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Critical Rationalism, Vienna, Austria: Verlag Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1979, p. 463-475.
HARSANYI, J. C. Bayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, and Arrow´s Impossibility Theorem. Theory and Decision, 11, 1979, p. 289-317.
HARSANYI, J. C. Analysis of a Family of Two-person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information. International Journal of Game Theory, 9, 1979, p. 65-89.
HARSANYI, J. C. Uses of Bayesian Probability Models in Game Theory. In D.H. Milnor (ed.), Science, Belief and Behaviour: Essays in Honour of R.B. Braithwaite, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 189-210.
HARSANYI, J. C. Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations, and the Theory of Rational Behavior, Theory and Decision, 12, 1980, p. 115-133.
HARSANYI, J. C. The Shapley Value and the Risk-Dominance Solutions of Two Bargaining Models for Chharacteristic-Function Games. In V. Böhm (ed.), Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, Mannheim, West Germany: B.I. Wissenschaftsverlag, 1981, p. 43-68.
HARSANYI, J. C. Noncooperative Bargaining Models. In Deistler et al. (eds.), Games, Economic, Dynamics, and Time Series Analysis, Vienna, Austria: Physica-Verlag, 1982, p. 49-58. i) Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games; ii) Rejoinder to Professors Kadane and Larkey, Manamement Science, 28, 1982, p. 120-125, 124-125.
HARSANYI, J. C. Some Epistemological Advantages of the Rule Utilitarian Position in Ethics. In P.E. French (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, VII, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p. 389-402.
HARSANYI, J. C. Solutions for Some Bargaining Games under the Harsanyi-Selten Solution Theory. Parts I-II, Mathematical Social Sciences, 3, 1982, p. 179-191 and 259-279.
HARSANYI, J. C. Mathematics, the Empirical Facts, and Logical Necessity. Erkenntnis, 19, 1983, p. 167-192.
HARSANYI, J. C. Use of Subjective Probabilities in Game Theory. In B.P. Stigum and F. Wenstop (eds.), Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory with Applications, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1983, p. 297-310.
HARSANYI, J. C. Basic Moral Decisions and Alternative Concepts of Rationality. Social Theory and Practice, 9, 1983, p. 231-244.
HARSANYI, J. C. Bayesian Decision Theory, Subjective and Objective Probabilities, and Acceptance of Empirical Hypotheses. Synthese, 57, 1983, p. 341-365.
HARSANYI, J. C. Bargaining and Game Theory. Advances in Management Studies, 2, 1983, p. 47-73.
HARSANYI, J. C. Acceptance of Empirical Statements: A Bayesian Theory without Cognitive Utilities. Theory and Decision, 18, 1985, p. 1-30.
HARSANYI, J. C. Rule Utilitarianism, Equality, and Justice. Social Philosophy and Policy, 2, 1985, p. 115-127.
HARSANYI, J. C. Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code to Follow, and, Indeed, To Follow Any Moral Code at All?. Ethics, 96, 1985, p. 42-55.
HARSANYI, J. C. On Preferences, Promises, and the Coordination Problem: Reply to Regan. Ethics, 96, 1985, p. 68-73.
HARSANYI, J. C. Individual Utilities and Utilitarian Ethics. In A Diekmann et al. (eds.), Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of A. Rapoport, Vienna and Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 1986, p. 1-12.
HARSANYI, J. C. Utilitarian Morality in a World of Very Half-hearted Altruists. In W.P. Heller et al. (eds.), Social Choice and Public Decision Making: Essays in Honor of K.J. Arrow, vol. 1 Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 57-73.
HARSANYI, J. C. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities, Risk Taking, and Welfare. In G.R. Feiwel (ed.), Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory, New York: New York University Press, 1987, p. 545-558.
HARSANYI, J. C. Some Recent Developments in Game Theory. In G. Eberlein et al. (eds.), Theory and Decision, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1987, p. 235-260. i) Bargaining; ii) Interprersonal Utility Comparisons; iii) Value Judgments, in The New Palgrave, Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1987.
HARSANYI, J. C. The Tracing Procedure: A Self-Correcting Reasoning Procedure. Theory and Decision, 22, 1987, p. 7-23.
HARSANYI, J. C. Morals by Agreement. A Review article on David Gauthier´s book of the same title, Economics and Philosophy, 3, 1987, p. 339-373.
HARSANYI, J. C. Assesing Other People´s Utilities. In B.E. Munier (ed.), Risk, Decision, and Rationality, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1988, p. 127-138.
HARSANYI, J. C. Problems with Act Utilitarianism and Malevolent Preferences. A critique of Richard Hare´s theory. In D. Seanor and N. Fotion (eds.), Hare and Critics, Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 89-99.
HARSANYI, J. C. Democracy, Equality, and Popular Consent. In I. Shapiro and G. Reeher (eds.), Power, Equality, and Politics, Boulder, CO: The Westview Press, 1988, p. 276-283.
HARSANYI, J. C. Game Solutions and the Normal Form. In A. Chikan (ed.), Progress in Decision, Utility and Risk Theory, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1991, p. 43-66.
HARSANYI, J. C. Equality, Responsibility, and Justice As Seen from a Utilitarian Perspective. Theory and Decision, 31, 1991, p. 141-158.
HARSANYI, J. C. In Defense of Game Theory. Rationality and Society, 4, 1992, p. 51-61.
HARSANYI, J. C. Game and Decision Theoretic Models in Ethics. In R.J. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory, vol. 1, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, North-Holland, 1992; Chapter 19.
HARSANYI, J. C. Expectation Effects, Individual Utilities, and Rational Desires. In Brad Hooker (ed.), Rationality, Rules and Utility, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, p. 115-126.
HARSANYI, J. C. Normative Validity and Meaning of von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities. In K. Binmore, A. Kirman, and P. Tani (eds.), Frontiers of Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993; Chapter 16.
Proceedings, přednášky
HARSANYI, J. C. Morality and Incentives. Presented at the Workshop on Ethics and Economics, in Siena, Italy, July 1991.
HARSANYI, J. C. A New Look at Strategic Rationality: At Equilibrium Selection, Risk Dominance and Payoff Dominance. Presented at the Nobel Symposium on Game Theory, in Björkborn, Sweden, June 1993.
HARSANYI, J. C. A Case for a Utilitarian Ethic. Presented at the International Workshop on the Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy, in Kiel, Germany, 1993.
HARSANYI, J. C. Human Nature, Economic Incentives, and Utilitarian Theory. Presented at a conference honoring the Oxford philosopher Richard Hare, in Gainesville, FL, March 1994.
HARSANYI, J. C. Utilities, Preferences, and Substantive Goods. To be published in a volume honoring Amartya Sen, edited by Paul Anand.