Eric Stark Maskin
Američan Eric Stark Maskin se narodil 12.12.1950 v New York City. Získal titul A.A. z matematiky, A.M. z aplikované matematiky a Ph.D. také z aplikované matematiky, a to na Harvard University.
V současnosti je E. S. Maskin profesorem na Institute for Advanced Study v Princetonu, proslaveném Einsteinem. Maskin sám pak žije od roku 2000 v domě na Mercer Street, který kdysi zakoupila Einsteinova žena a který až do 80. let obývali členové Einsteinovy rodiny. E. Maskin dále vyučuje také na známé Princeton University.
Je členem např. American Economic Association, Game Theory Society, European Economic Association, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, působí jako člen korespondent British Academy, v roce 2003 předsedal Econometric Society.
Profesor Maskin je ženatý s profesorkou dějin na Princeton University Gayle Sawtelle, se kterou vychovává své dva potomky – syna Josepha (20) a dceru Charlotte (17). Mezi jeho nejoblíbenější hobby patří hra na klarinet.
Ocenění světového významu se mu dostalo v roce 2007 spolu s dalšími dvěma Američany – L. Hurwiczem a R. Myersonem.
Knihy
MASKIN, E., SIMONOVITS, A. Planning, Shortage and Transformation. MIT Press, 2000.
DASGUPTA, P., GALE, D., MASKIN, E., et al. Economic Analysis of Markets and Games. MIT Press, 1992.
Články
DASGUPTA, P., MASKIN, E. Uncertainty and hyperbolic discounting. American Economic Review, 2005, vol. 95, no. 4, p. 1290 – 1299.
MASKIN, E. Jean-Jacques Laffont: A look back. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2004, vol. 2, no. 5, p. 913 – 923.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. The politician and the judge: Accountability in government. American Economic Review, 2004, vol. 94, no. 4, p. 1034 – 1054.
MASKIN, E. The unity of auction theory: Milgrom’s masterclass. Journal of Economic Literature, 2004, vol. 42, no. 4, p. 1102 – 1115.
KORNAI, J., MASKIN, E., ROLLAND, G. Understanding the soft budget constraint. Journal of Economic Literature, 2003, vol. 41. no. 4, p. 1095 – 1136.
MASKIN, E., RILEY, J. Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 45, no. 2, p. 395 – 409.
MASKIN, E. On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts. European Economic Review, 2002, vol. 46, no. 4-5, p. 725 – 733.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. Markov perfect equilibrium: I. Observable actions. Journal of Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 100, no. 2, p. 191 – 219.
MASKIN, E., XU, C. Soft budget constraint theories: from centralization to the market. The Economics of Transition, 2001, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 1 – 27.
MASKIN, E., RILEY, J. Asymmetric auctions. Review of Economic Studies, 2000, vol. 67, no. 3, p. 413 – 438.
MASKIN, E. Auctions, development and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers. European Economic Review, 2000, vol. 44, no. 4-6, p. 667 – 681.
DASGUPTA, P., MASKIN, E. Efficient auctions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, vol. 115, no. 2, p. 341 – 388.
MASKIN, E., RILEY, J. Equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions. Review of Economic Studies, 2000, vol. 67, no. 3, p. 430 – 454.
MASKIN, E., QIAN, Y., XU, C. Incentives, information, and organizational form. Review of Economic Studies, 2000, vol. 67, no. 2, p. 359 – 378.
CHEN, M. A., MASKIN, E. Bargaining, production and monotonicity in economic environment. Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 89, no. 1, p. 140 – 147.
MASKIN, E., MOORE, J. Implementation and regeneration. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, vol. 66, no. 1, p. p. 39 – 56.
MASKIN, E. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, vol. 66, no. 1, p. 23 – 38.
MASKIN, E. Research articles: Uncertainty and entry deterrence. Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 429 – 437.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. Two remarks on the property-rights literature. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, vol. 66, no. 1, p. 139 – 149.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, vol. 66, no. 1, p. 83 – 114.
MASKIN, E. Theories of the soft-budget constraint. Japan and the World Economy, 1996, vol. 8, no. 2. p. 125 – 133.
BANERJEE, A. V., MASKIN, E. A Walrasian theory of money and barter. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996, vol. 111, no. 4, p. 955 – 1005.
DEWATRIPONT, M., MASKIN, E. Contractual contingencies and renegotiation. RAND Journal of Economics, 1995, vol. 26, no. 4, p. 704 – 719.
DEWATRIPONT, M., MASKIN, E. Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies. Review of Economic Studies, 1995, vol. 62, no. 4, p. 541 – 555.
MASKIN, E. Long-term investment by Japanese and American firms. Japan and the World Economy, 1995, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 249 – 254.
FUDENBERG, D., LEVINE, D., MASKIN, E. The Folk theorem with imperfect public information. Econometrica, 1994, vol. 62, no. 5, p. 997 – 1039.
MASKIN, E. The invisible hand and externalities. American Economic Review, 1994, vol. 84, no. 2, p. 333 – 337.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal, II: Common values. Econometrica, 1992, vol. 60, no. 1, p. 428 – 438.
FUDENBERG, D., MASKIN, E. On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory, 1991, vol. 53, no. 2, p. 428 – 438.
DEWATRIPONT, M., MASKIN, E. Contract renegotiation in models of assymetric information. European Economic Review, 1990, vol. 34, no. 2 – 3, p. 311 – 321.
MASKIN, E., NEWBERY, D. M. Disadvantagenous oil tariffs and dynamic consistency. American Economic Association, 1990, vol. 80, no. 1, p. 143 – 156.
LAFFONT, J.-J., MASKIN, E. The efficient market hypothesis and insider trading on the stock market. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, vol. 98, no. 1, p. 70 – 93.
FUDENBERG, D., MASKIN, E. Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games. American Economic Review, 1990, vol. 80, no. 2, p. 274 – 279.
FUDENBERG, D., MASKIN, E. Nash and prfect equilibria of discounted repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory, 1990, vol. 51, no. 1, p. 194 – 206.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal, The case of values. Econometrica, 1990, vol. 58, no. 2, p. 379 – 409.
FUDENBERG, D., KREPS, D. M., MASKIN, E. Repeated games with long-run and short-run players. Review of Economic Studies, 1990, vol. 57, no. 4, p. 555 – 573.
EVANS, R., MASKIN, E. Efficient renegenarion – proof in equilibria in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior, 1989, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 360 – 369.
LAFFONT, J.-J., MASKIN, E. Rational expectations with imperfect competition: A Bertrand-Edgeworth example. Economics Letters, 1989, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 269 – 274.
FARRELL, J., MASKIN, E. Renegotiation in repeated games. Games and Economic Behavior, 1989, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 327 – 360.
FARRELL, J., MASKIN, E. Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply. Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, vol. 49, no. 2, p. 376 – 378.
MASKIN, R., TIROLE, J. A theory of dynamic oligopoly, I: Overview and quantity competition with large fixed costs. Econometrica, 1988, vol. 56, no. 3, p. 549 – 569.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. A theory of dynamic oligopoly, II: Price competition , Kinked demand curves and Edgeworth cycles. Econometrica, 1988, vol. 56, no. 3, p. 571 – 599.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. Corrigendum to „A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III, Cournot competition“. European Economic Review, 1988, vol. 32, no. 7, p. 549 – 569.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. Correlated equilibria and sunspots. Journal of Economic Theory, 1987, vol. 43, no. 2, p. 364 – 373.
LAFFONT, J.-J., MASKIN, E. Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality: Behavior and regulation. European Economic Review, 1987, vol. 31, no. 1-2, p. 483 – 489.
DASGUPTA, P., MASKIN, E. The simple economics of research portfolios. Economic Journal, 1987, vol. 97, no. 387, p. 581 – 595.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III: Cournot competition. European Economic Review, 1987, vol. 31, no. 4, p. 947 – 968.
RADNER, R., MYERSON, R., MASKIN, E. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria. Review of Economic Studies, 1986, vol. 53, no. 1, p. 59 – 69.
DASGUPTA, P., MASKIN, E. The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, I: Theory. Review of Economic Studies, 1986, vol. 53, no. 1, p. 1 – 26.
DASGUPTA, P., MASKIN, E. The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, II: Applications. Review of Economic Studies, 1986, vol. 53, no. 1, p. 27 – 41.
MASKIN, E. The existence of equilibrium with price-setting firms. American Economic Review, 1986, vol. 76, no. 2, p. 382 – 386.
FUDENBERG, D., MASKIN, E. The Folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica, 1986, vol. 54, no. 3, p. 533 – 554.
MASKIN, E., RILEY, J. Auction theory with private values. American Economic Association, 1985, vol. 75, no. 2, p. 150 – 155.
MASKIN, E., RILEY, J. Input versus output incentive schemes. Journal of Public Economics, 1985, vol. 28, no. 1, p. 1 – 23.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. On the efficiency of fixed price equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 1984, vol. 32, no. 2, p. 317 – 327.
MASKIN, E., RILEY, J. Monopoly with incomplete information. RAND Journal of Economics, 1984, vol. 15, no. 2, p. 171 – 196.
MASKIN, E., RILEY, J. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers. Econometrica, 1984, vol. 52, no. 6, p. 1473 – 1518.
LAFFONT, J.-J., MASKIN, E. A characterization of strongly locally incentive compatible planning procedures with public goods. Review of Economic Studies, 1983, vol. 50, no. 1, p. 171 – 186.
GROSSMAN, S. J., HART, O., MASKIN, E. Unemployment with observable aggregate shocks. Journal of Political Economy, 1983, vol. 91, no. 6, p. 907 – 928.
LAFFONT, J.-J., MASKIN, E. Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 17 – 47.
DIAMOND, P. A., MASKIN, E. An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract, II: Steady state example. Journal of Economic Theory, 1981, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 165 – 195.
LAFFONT, J.-J., MASKIN, E. A differential approach to dominant strategy mechanisms. Econometrica, 1980, vol. 48, no. 6, p. 1507 – 1520.
DASGUPTA, P., HAMMOND, P., MASKIN, E. On imperfect information and optimal pollution control. 1980, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 47, no. 5, p. 857 – 860.
LAFFONT, J.-J., MASKIN, E. Optimal reservation price in the Vickery auction. Economics Letters, 1980, vol. 6, no. 4, p. 309 – 313.
LAFFONT, J.-J., MASKIN, E. On the difficulty of attaining distributional goals with imperfect information about consumers. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1979, vol. 81, no. 2, p. 227 – 237.
DIAMOND, P. A., MASKIN, E. An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of comtract, I: Steady states. Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 282 – 316.
DASGUPTA, P., HAMMOND, P., MASKIN, E. The implementation of social choice rules: Some general results on incentive compatibility. Review of Economic Studies, 1979, vol. 46, no. 2, p. 185 – 216.
FISHBURN, P. C., GEHRLEIN, W. V., MASKIN, E. A progress report on Kelly’s majority conjectures. Economics Letters, 1979, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 313 – 314.
MASKIN, E. A theorem on utilitarianism. Review of Economic Studies, 1978, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 93 – 96.
Working papers, proceedings, přednášky, aj.
MASKIN, E., ROBERTS, W. S. On the fundamental theorems of general equilibrium. Economics Working Papers no. 0074, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2006.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. Public-private partnerships and government spending limits. Economics Working Papers no. 0075, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2006.
MASKIN, E. On the rationale for penalty default rules. Economics Working Papers no. 0058, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2006.
BESSEN, J., MASKIN, E. Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation Economics Working Papers no. 0025, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2006.
DASGUPTA, P., MASKIN, E. Uncertainty and hyperbolic discounting. Economics Working Papers no. 0023, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2004.
MASKIN, E. The unity of auction theory: Paul Milgrom’s masterclass. Economics Working Papers no. 0044, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2004.
MASKIN, E., RILEY, J. Uniquenness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions. Economics Working Papers no. 0031, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social science, 2003.
BALIGA, S., MASKIN, E. Mechanism design for the environment. Economics Working Papers no. 0024, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2002.
KORNAI, J., MASKIN, E., ROLAND, G. Understanding the soft budget constraint. Economics Working Papers no. 0019, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2002.
MASKIN, E. Auctions and efficiency. Economics Working Papers no. 0002, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2001.
MASKIN, E. On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts. Economics Working Papers no. 0008, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2001.
MASKIN, E., SJOSTROM, T. Implementation theory. Economics Working Papers no. 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2001.
MASKIN, E. Roy Radner and incentive theory. Economics Working Papers no 0004, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, 2001.
MASKIN, E., CHENG-GANG, X. Soft budget constraint theories: from centralization to the market. CEPR Discussion Papers no. 2715, 2001.
MASKIN, E., MOORE, J. Implementation and regeneration. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers no. 1863, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 1999.
DASGUPTA, P., MASKIN, E. Efficient auctions. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers no. 1857, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 1998.
MASKIN, E., MOORE, J. Implementations and regeneration. Theoretical Economics Paper Series no. 366, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, 1998.
MASKIN, E. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers no. 1829, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 1998.
MASKIN, E., QIAN, Y., XU, C. Incentives. CEP discussion papers no. 0371, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, 1997.
MASKIN, E., TIROLE, J. Unforseen contingencies, property rights and incomplete contracts. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers no. 1796, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 1997.
MASKIN, E., QIAN, Y., XU, C. Incentives, scale economies, and organizational form. William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series no. 51, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School, 1997.
MASKIN, E., QIAN, Y., XU, C. Incentives, information, and organizational form. Working Papers no. 97034, Stanford University, Department of Economics, 1997.
FUDENBERG, D., LEVINE, D. K., MASKIN, E. Balanced-budget mechanisms with incomplete information. Levine’s Working Paper Archive no. 59, UCLA Department of Economics, 1996.
KREMER, M., MASKIN, E. Wage inequality and segregation. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers no. 1777, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 1996.
KREMER, M., MASKIN, E. Wage inequality and segregation by skill. NBER Working Papers no. 5718, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.
BANERJEE, A. V., MASKIN, E. A Walrasian theory of money. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers no. 1753, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 1996.
KREMER, M., MASKIN, E. Segregation by skill and the rise of inequality. Papers e-95-7, Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1995.