Vernon Lomax Smith
Profesor ekonomických věd a práva na George Mason University ve Fairfaxu, Virginia, Vernon Lomax Smith, se narodil 1. ledna 1927 ve městě Wichita v rodině politicky aktivních rodičů, kteří mu později byli důležitou oporou i inspirací v jeho prvotním zájmu o ekonomii. Domovem je mu nyní americký Kansas.
Titul bakaláře získal Smith v roce 1994 v oboru elektro na California Institute of Technology. Magisterská studia ekonomických věd pak ukončil v roce 1952 na University of Kansas . Doktorát filozofie v ekonomických vědách získal Vernon Smith v roce 1955 na proslulé Harvard University.
V roce 2001 nastává v práci profesora Smithe významný zlom. Opouští spolu s dalšími šesti kolegy své dosavadní působiště v Economic Science Laboratory na University of Arizona a zakládá Interdisciplinary Center for Experimental Science (ICES) na George Mason University a toto Centrum doposud řídí.
Nobelovou cenou byl Smith odměněn za průkopnické užití psychologie a experimentální ekonomie v procesu rozhodování. Demonstroval důležitost alternativních modelů a stal se jedním z průkopníků prudce se rozvíjejícího oboru laboratorních experimentů, zkoumajících fungování trhu. Je považován za vůdčí osobnost vývoje experimentální ekonomie, tedy myšlenky, že v laboratorních podmínkách lze otestovat celou řadu ekonomických tezí.
Vernon Smith je podruhé ženatý. Z manželství s Joyce Harkleroad (1950) má tři potomky – dvojčata Doborah a Erica a dceru Torrii, syna Joshuu pak z manželství s Carol Breckner.
Profesor Vernon L. Smith je autorem či spoluautorem více jak dvou stovek článků a knih s tematikou teorie kapitálu, financí, ekonomických zdrojů a experimentální ekonomiky a kromě toho, že je nositelem Ceny Švédské banky za ekonomii na paměť Alfreda Nobela (Nobelovy ceny), obdržel za svou práci i řadu dalších významných ocenění a uznání.
Knihy
The law and economics of irrational behavior. Edited by F. Parisi, V. L. Smith. Stanford: Stanford Economics and Finance, 2005.
MILLER, R. M., SMITH, V. L. Paving Wall Street: Experimental economics and the quest for the perfect market. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002.
SMITH, V. L. Bargaining and market behavior: Essays in experimental economics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
SMITH, V. L. Papers in experimental economics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
SMITH, V. L. Experimental economics. Northwestern University, 1990.
SMITH, V. L. Research in experimental economics: a research annual. Vol. 1. Greenwich: JAI Press, 1979.
DAVIDSON, R. K., SMITH, V. L. and WILEY, J. F. Economics: an analytical approach. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1962.
Články
SMITH, V. L. Behavioral economics research and the foundation of economics. Journal of Socio-Economics, Greenwich: March 2005, vol. 34, no. 2, p. 135 – 150.
SMITH, V. L. Hayek and experimental economics. Review of Austrian Economics, Washington: June 2005, vol. 18, no. 2, p. 135 – 144.
HOUSER, D., McCABE, K., SMITH, V. L. Cultural group selection, co evolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam: 2004, vol. 53, no. 1, p. 85 – 88.
SMITH, V. L. Human nature: an economic perspective. Daedalus, Boston: Fall 2004, vol. 133, no. 4, p. 67 – 76.
DURHAM, Y., McCABE, K., SMITH, V. L., et al. Oligopoly competition in fixed cost environments. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2004, vol. 22, no. 2, p. 147 – 162.
SMITH, V. L. Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. The American Economic Review, Nashville: June 2003, vol. 93, no. 3, p. 465 – 508.
SMITH, V. L. Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. Finance India, Delhi: March 2003, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 85.
RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L., WILSON, B. J. Controlling market power and price spikes in electricity networks: Demand-side bidding. Proceedings of the National Academy Science of the United States of America, Washington: March 4 2003, vol. 100, no. 5, p. 2998.
RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L., WILSON, B. J. Discriminatory price auctions in electricity markets: low volatility at the expense of high price levels. Journal of Regulatory Economics, Norwell: March 2003, vol. 23, no. 2, p. 109 – 123.
SMITH, V. L. Give all Iraqis a share; Auctions of state wealth go back to Rome, but no one has ever done it fairly. Now there’s a chance to get it right in Iraq. Newsweek (International ed.), New York: Oct. 6, 2003, p. 49.
SMITH, V. L. The lab man. Finance & Development, Washington: March 2003, vol. 40, no. 1, p. 6 – 8.
McCABE, K., RIGDON, M. L., SMITH, V. L. Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam: Oct. 2003, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 267 – 275.
BANKS, J., OLSON, M., SMITH, V. L., et al. Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam: 2003, vol. 51, no. 3, p. 303 – 350.
SMITH, V. L. Iron range steam. Steam, Milwaukee: March 2002, vol. 62, no. 3, p. 68 – 70.
SMITH, V. L. LEMs and rents. Regulation, Washington: Summer 2002, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 2.
SMITH, V. L. Method in experiment: rhetoric and reality. Experimental Economics, Boston: Oct. 2002, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 91 – 110.
RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L., WILSON, B. J. Using experiments to inform the privatization/deregulation movement in electricity. The Cato Journal, Washington: Winter 2002, vol. 21, no. 3, p. 515 – 544.
GUNNTHORSDOTTIR, A., McCABE, K., SMITH, V. L. Using the Machiavellianism instrument to predict trustworthiness in a bargaining game. Journal of Economic Psychology, Amsterdam: 2002, vol. 23, no. 1, p. 49 – 66.
SMITH, V. L. From old issues to new directions in experimental psychology and economics. Behavioral and Brain Science, Cambridge: June 2001, vol. 24, no. 3, p. 428.
KUZBAN, R., McCABE, K., SMITH, V. L., et. al. Incremental commitment and reciprocity in a real-time public goods game. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Thousand Oaks: Dec. 2001, vol. 27, no. 12, p. 1662.
DENTON, M. J., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L., et al. Market power in a deregulated electrical industry. Decision Support Systems, Amsterdam: Jan. 2001, vol. 10, p. 357.
DENTON, M. J., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Spot market mechanism design and competitivity issues in electric power. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam: Apr. 2001, vol. 44, no. 4, p. 435 – 453.
RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L., WILSON, B. J. Turning off the lights. Regulation, Washington: Fall 2001, vol. 24, no. 3, p. 70 – 76.
RASSENTI, S. J., REYNOLDS, S. S., SMITH, V. L., et al. Adaptation and convergence of behavior in repeated Cournot games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam: Feb. 2000, vol. 41, no. 2, p. 117 – 146.
McCABE, K. A., SMITH, V. L. A comparison of naive and sophisticated subject behavior with game theoretic predictions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America, Washington: March 28 2000, vol. 97, no. 7, p. 3777.
MURPHY, J. J., DINAR, A., SMITH, V. L., et al. The design of „smart“ water market institutions using laboratory experiments. Environmental and Reresource Economics, Dordrecht: Dec. 2000, vol. 17, no. 4, p. 375.
SMITH, V. L., VanBOENING, M., WELLFORD, C. P. Dividend timing and behavior in laboratory asset markets. Economic Theory, Berlin – Heidelberg: 2000, vol. 16, no. 3, p. 567 – 583.
BURNHAM, T., McCABE, K., SMITH, V. L. Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Amsterdam: Sep. 2000, vol. 43, no. 1, p. 57 – 73.
HOFFMAN, E., McCABE, K., SMITH, V. L. The impact of exchange context on the activation of equity in ultimatum games. Experimental Economics, Boston: 2000, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 5 – 9.
McCABE, K. A., SMITH, V. L., LePORE, M. Internationality detection and „mindreading“: why does game form matter? Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America, Washington: Apr. 11 2000, vol. 97, no. 8, p. 4404.
CAGINALP, G., PORTER, D., SMITH, V. L. Momentum and overreaction in experimental asset markets. International Journal of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam: 2000, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 187 – 204.
SMITH, V. L. Reflections on human action after 50 years. The Cato Journal, Washington: Fall 1999, vol. 19, no. 2, p. 195 – 209.
HOFFMAN, E., McCABE, K., SMITH, V. L. Social distance and other–regarding behavior in dictator games: Reply. The American Economic Review, Nashville: March 1999, vol. 89, no 1, p. 340 – 341.
COX, J. C., DINKIN, S. H., SMITH, V. L. The winner’s curse and public information in common value auctions: comment. The American Economic Review, Nashville: March 1999, vol. 89, no. 1, p. 319 – 324.
HOFFMAN, E., McCABE, K. A., SMITH, V. L. Behavioral foundations of reciprocity: experimental economics and evolutionary psychology. Economic Inquiry, Huntington Beach: July 1998, vol. 36, no. 3, p. 335 – 352.
DURHAM, Y., HIRSHLEIFER, J., SMITH, V. L. Do the rich get richer and the poor poorer? Experimental tests of a model of power. The American Economic Review. Nashville: Sep. 1998, vol. 88, no. 4, p. 970 – 983.
VanBOENING, M. V., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Numerical computation of equilibrium bid functions in a first-price auction with heterogeneous risk attitudes. Experimental Economics, Boston: 1998, vol. 1, no. 2, s. 147 – 159.
McCABE, K., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Reciprocity, trust, and payoff privacy in extensive form bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior, Amsterdam: 1998, vol. 24, no. 1-2, p. 10 – 24.
SMITH, V. L. The two face sof Adam Smith. The Southern Economic Journal, Stillwater: 1998, vol. 65, no. 1, p. 2 – 19.
FRANCIOSI, R., KUJAL, P., SMITH, V. L., et al. Experimental tests of the endowment effect. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam: 1996, vol. 30, no. 2, p. 213 – 226.
McCABE, K. A., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Washington: Nov. 12 1996, vol. 93, no. 23, p. 13421 – 13428.
SMITH, V. L. Regulatory reform in the electric power industry. Regulation, Washington: 1996, vol. 19, no. 1, p. 33 – 46.
HOFFMAN, E., McCABE, K. A., SMITH, V. L. On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games. International Journal of Game Theory, 1996, vol. 25, no. 3, p. 289 – 301.
HOFFMAN, E., McCABE, K. A., SMITH, V. L. Reciprocity: the behavioral foundation of socio-economic games. Understanding Strategic Interaction, Albers: 1996, p. 328 – 344.
HOFFMAN, E., McCABE, K. A., SMITH, V. L. Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games. The American Economic Review, Nashville: June 1996, vol. 86, no. 3, p. 653 – 660.
PORTER, D. P., SMITH, V. L. Futures contracting and divident uncertainty in experimental asset markets. The Journal of Business, Chicago: Oct. 1995, vol. 68, no. 4, p. 509 – 541.
KRUSE, J. B., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L., et al. Betrand-Edgeworth competition in experimental markets. Econometrica, Evanston: March 1994, vol. 62, no. 2, p. 343 – 371.
RASSENTI, S. J., REYNOLDS, S. S., SMITH, V. L. Contenancy and competition in an experimental auction market for natural gas popelíne networks. Economic Theory, Berlin – Heidelberg: 1994, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 41 – 69.
SMITH, V. L. Economics in the laboratory. The Journal of Economis Perspectives, Nashville: Winter 1994, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 113 – 131.
SMITH, V. L. Metodos experimentales en economia y en politica economia. Informacion comercial espanola, Madrid: 1993, vol. 2, no. 54, p. 11 – 50.
SMITH, V. L., WALKER, J. M. Monetary rewards and decision cost in experimental economics. Economic Inquiry, Huntington Beach: Apr. 1993, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 245 – 261.
WEG, E., SMITH, V. L. On the failure to induce meger offers in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Psychology, Amsterdam: 1993, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 17 – 32.
SMITH, V. L., WALKER, J. M. Rewards, experience and decision costs in first price auctions. Economic Inquiry, Huntington Beach: Apr. 1993, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 237 – 244.
McCABE, K. A., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Designing call auction institutions: Is double Dutch the best? The Economic Journal, Oxford: Jan. 1992, vol. 102, no. 410, p. 9 – 23.
SMITH, V. L. Economic principles in the emergence of humankind: presidential address to The Western Economic Association. Economic Inquiry, Huntington Beach: Jan. 1992, vol. 30, no. 1, p. 1 – 13.
SMITH, V. L., WILLIAMS, A. W. Experimental market economics. Scientific American, New York: Dec. 1992, vol. 267, vol. 6, p. 116.
COX, J. C., SMITH, V. L., WALKER, J. M. Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions: Comment. The American Economic Review, Nashville: Dec. 1992, vol. 82, no. 5, p. 1393 – 1412.
SMITH, V. L. Game theory and experimental economics: Beginnings and early influences. History of Political Economy, Durham: 1992, vol. 24, p. 241.
McCABE, K. A., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Designing „smart“ computer-assisted markets: an experimental auction for gas networks. Papers in Experimental Economics, 1991, vol. S, p. 678 – 702.
McCABE, K. A., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Experimental research on deregulated markets for natural gas popelíne and electric power transmission network. Research in Law and Economics: A Research Annual. Amsterdam: 1991, vol. 13, p. 161 – 189.
SMITH, V. L., WILLIAMS, A. W. On nonbinding price controls in a competitive market. Papers in Experimental Economics, 1991, vol. S, p. 164 – 171.
CAMPBELL, J., LaMASTER, S., SMITH, V. L., et al. Off-floor trading, disintegration, and the bid-ask spread in experimental markets. The Journal of Business, Chicago: Oct. 1991, vol. 64, no. 4, p. 495 – 527.
SMITH, V. L. Rational choice: the contrast between economics and psychology. Journal of Political Economy, Chicago: 1991, vol. 99, no. 4, p. 877 – 897.
McCABE, K. A., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Smart computer-assisted markets. Science, Washington: Oct. 25 1991, vol. 254, no. 5031, p. 534 – 538.
McCABE, K. A., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Testing Vickrey’s and other simultaneous multiple unit versions of the English auction. Research in Experimental Economics, Amsterdam: 1991, vol. 4, p. 45 – 79.
SMITH, V. L. Rational choice: The contrast between economics and psychology. The Journal of Political Economy, Chicago: Aug. 1991, vol. 99, no. 4, p. 877.
McCABE, K. A., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Auction design for composite goods: the natural gas industry. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam: Sep. 1990, vol. 14, no. 5, p. 127 – 149.
McCABE, K. A., RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L. Auction institutional design: Theory and behavior of simultaneous multiple-unit generalizations of the Dutch and English auctions. The American Economic Review, Nashville: Dec. 1990, vol. 80, no. 5, p. 1276 – 1283.
WALKER, J. M., SMITH, V. L., COX, J. C. Inducing risk-neutral preferences: an examination in a controlled market environment. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Boston: 1990, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 5 – 24.
SMITH, V. L., McCABE, K. A., RASSENTI, S. J. Designing „smart“ computer-assisted markets: an experimental auction for gas networks. European Journal of Political Economy, 1989, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 259 – 283.
SMITH, V. L. Theory, experiment and economics. The Journal of Economic Perspectives (1986-1998). Nashville: Winter 1989, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 151 – 169.
SMITH, V. L., SUCHANEK, G. L., WILLIAMS, A. W. Bubbles, crashes, and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets. Econometrica, Evanston: Sep. 1988, vol. 56, no. 5, p. 1119 – 1151.
SMITH, V. L. Electric power deregulation: background and prospects. Contemporary Economic Policy, Oxford: July 1988, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 14 – 24.
SMITH, V. L., SUCHANEK, G. L., WILLIAMS, A. W. An experimental analysis of stock market bubbles: prices, expectations and market efficiency. Finanzmarkt und Portfolio-Management, Luzern: 1988, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 19 – 32.
SMITH, V. L. New directions in economics. Journal of Business Administration, Vancouver: 1988, vol. 18, no. 1, 2, p. 41 – 52.
COX, J. C., SMITH, V. L., WALKER, J. M. Theory and individual behavior of first-price auctions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Boston: 1988, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 61 – 99.
WALKER, J. M., SMITH, V. L., COX, J. C. Bidding behavior in first price dealer bid auctions: use of computerized nash competitors. Economic Letters, Amsterdam: 1987, vol. 23, no. 3, p. 239 – 244.
SMITH, V. L. Currents of competition in electricity markets. Regulation, Washington: 1987, vol. 11, no. 2, p. 23 – 29.
BUCCOLA, S. T., SMITH, V. L. Uncertainty and partial adjustment in double-auction markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Amsterdam: Dec. 1987, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 587 – 601.
SMITH, V. L. Experimental methods in the political economy of exchange. Science, Washington: Oct. 10 1986, vol. 234, no. 4773, p. 167 – 173.
COX, J. C., SMITH, V. L. Expected revenue in discriminative and uniform price dealer-bid auctions. Research in Experimental Economics: A Research Annual. Amsterdam: 1985, vol. 3, p. 182 – 232.
COX, J. C., SMITH, V. L., WALKER, J. M. Experimental development of sealed-bid auction theory: calibrating controls for risk aversion. The American Economic Review, Nashville: May 1985, vol. 75, no. 2, p. 160 – 165.
SMITH, V. L. Experimental Economics: Reply. The American Economic Review, Nashville: 1985, vol. 75, no. 1. p. 264 – 272.
KNEZ, P., SMITH, V. L., WILLIAMS, A. W. Individual rationality, market rationality, and value estimation. The American Economic Review, Nashville: May 1985, vol. 75, no. 2, p. 397 – 402.
ISAAC, R. M., SMITH, V. L. In search of predatory pricing. The Journal of Political Economy, Chicago: Apr. 1985, vol. 93, no. 2, p. 320 – 345.
KETCHAM, J., SMITH, V. L., WILLIAMS, A. W. A comparison of posted-offer and double- auction pricing institutions. Review of Economic Studies, 1984, vol. 51, no. 4, p. 595 – 614.
WILLIAMS, A. W., SMITH, V. L. Cyclical double-auction markets with and without speculators. The Journal of Business, Chicago: Jan. 1984, vol. 57, no. 1, p. 1 – 33.
COURSEY, D. L., SMITH, V. L. Experimental tests of an allocation mechanism for private public or externality goods. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Oxford: 1984, vol. 86, no. 4, p. 468 – 484.
COURSEY, D. L., ISAAC, R. M., SMITH, V. L. Market contestability in the presence of sunk (entry) costs. The Rand Journal of Economics, Mount Morris: Spring 1984, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 69 – 84.
COURSEY, D. L., ISAAC, R. M., SMITH, V. L. Natural monopoly and contested markets: some experimental results. Journal of Law and Economics, Chicago: Apr. 1984, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 91 – 113.
COX, J. C., ISAAC, R. M., SMITH, V. L. OCS learning and auctions: incentives and the performance of alternative bidding institutions. Supreme Court Economic Review, Chicago: 1984, vol. 2, p. 43 – 87.
COX, J. C., SMITH, V. L., WALKER, J. M. Theory and behavior of multiple unit discriminative auctions. The Journal of Finance, Cambridge: Sep. 1984, vol. 39, no. 4, p. 983 – 1005.
COURSEY, D. L., SMITH, V. L. Price controls in a posted offer market. The American Economic Review, Nashville: March 1983, vol. 73, no. 1, p. 218 – 221.
RASSENTI, S. J., SMITH, V. L., BULFIN, R. L. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 402 – 417.
SMITH, V. L., WILLIAMS, A. W., BRATTON, W. K., et al. Competitive market institutions: double auctions vs. sealed bid-offer auctions. The American Economic Review, Nashville: March 1982, vol. 72, no. 1, p. 58 – 77.
SMITH, V. L. Markets as economizers of information: experimental examination of the „Hayek hypothesis“. Economic Inquiry, Huntington Beach: Apr. 1982, vol. 20, vol. 2, p. 165 – 179.
SMITH, V. L. Microeconomic systems as an experimental science. The American Economic Review, Nashville: Dec. 1982, vol. 72, no. 5, p. 923 – 955.
SMITH, V. L., WILLIAMS, A. W. On nonbinding price controls in a competitive market. The American Economic Review, Nashville: June 1981, vol. 71, no. 3, p. 467 – 474.
SMITH, V. L. Experiments with a decentralized mechanism for public good decision. The American Economic Review, Nashville: Sep. 1980, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 584 – 599.
COPPINGER, V. M., SMITH, V. L., TITUS, J. A. Incentives and behavior in English, Dutch and sealed-bid auctions. Economic Inquiry, Huntington Beach: Jan. 1980, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 1 – 22.
SMITH, V. L. An experimental comparison of three public good decision mechanisms. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1979, vol. 81, no. 2. p. 198 – 215.
SMITH, V. L., PLOTT, C. R. An experimental examination of two exchange institutions. Review of Economic Studies, Febr. 1978, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 133 – 153.
SMITH, V. L. Psychology and economics: discussion. The American Economic Review, Nashville: 1978, vol. 68, no. 2, p. 76 – 77.
MILLER, R. M., PLOTT, C. R., SMITH, V. L. Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: an empirical study of speculation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1977, vol. 91, no. 4, p. 599 – 624.
SMITH, V. L. The principle of unanimisty and voluntary consent in social choice. The Journal of Political Economy, Chicago: Dec. 1977, vol. 85, no. 6, p. 1125 – 1139.
SMITH, V. L. Control theory applied to natural and environmental reresources. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, New York: March 1977, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 1.
SMITH, V. L. The borrower-lender relationship. The American Economic Review. Nashville: June 1976, vol. 66, no. 3, p. 406 – 407.
SMITH, V. L. Experimental economics: induced value theory. The American Economic Review, Nashville: May 1976, vol. 66, no. 2, p. 274 – 279.
SMITH, V. L. The primitive hunter culture, pleistocene extinction, and rise of agriculture. Journal of Political Economy, Chicago: 1975, vol. 83, no. 4, p. 727 – 755.
SMITH, V. L. Economic theory and its discontents. The American Economic Review, Nashville: 1974, vol. 64, no. 2, p. 320 – 322.
SMITH, V. L. Review 4 – no title. The Journal of Business, Chicago: Jan. 1974, vol. 47, no. 1, p. 96 – 98.
SMITH, V. L. Default risk, scale, and the homemade leverage theorem. The American Economic Review, Nashville: 1972, vol. 62, no. 1, p. 66 – 76.
SMITH, V. L. Dynamics of waste accumulation: disposal versus recycling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1972, vol. 86, no. 4, p. 600 – 616.
SMITH, V. L. On models of commercial fishing: the traditional literature needs no defenders. Journal of Political Economy, Chicago: 1972, vol. 80, no. 4, p. 776 – 778.
SMITH, V. L. A theory and test of credit rationing: some generalizations. The American Economic Review, Nashville: 1972, vol. 62, no. 3, p. 477 – 483.
SMITH, V. L. Economics of production from natural reresources: reply. The American Economic Review, Nashville: 1971, vol. 61, no. 3, p. 488 – 491.
SMITH, V. L. Corporate financial theory under uncertainty. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, vol. 84, no. 3, p. 451 – 471.
SMITH, V. L. Investment behavior discussion. The American Economic Review, 1970, vol. 60, no. 2, p. 29 – 30.
SMITH, V. L. Measuring nonmonetary utilities in uncertain choices: The Ellsberg Urn. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1969, vol. 83, no. 2, p. 324 – 329.
SMITH, V. L. On models of commercial fishing. Journal of Political Economy, Chicago: 1969, vol. 77, no. 2, p. 181 – 198.
SMITH, V. L. Taxes and share valuation in competitive markets. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1969, vol. 51, no. 1, p. 96 – 99.
SMITH, V. L. Experimental studies of discrimination versus competition in sealed-bid auction markets: I. Introduction. The Journal of Business, Chicago: Jan. 1967, vol. 40, no. 1, p. 56 – 85.
SMITH, V. L. Depreciation, market valuations, and investment theory. Management Science, Linthicum: July 1963, vol. 9, no. 4, p. 690 – 696.
SMITH, V. L. An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of Political Economy, Chicago: June 1962.
SMITH, V. L. Economic equipment policies: an evaluation. Management Science, Linthicum: Oct. 1957, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 20 – 37.
SMITH, V. L. Engineering data and statistical techniques in the analysis of production and technological change: fuel requirements of the trucking industry. Econometrica, Evanston: Apr. 1957, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 281 – 302.
Working papers
HOUSER, D., XIAO, E., SMITH, V. L., et al. When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation. Experimental 0502001, Economics Working Paper Archive Econ WPA, revised 18 Feb 2005.
McCABE, K., RIGDON, M., SMITH, V. L. Sustaining cooperation in trust games. Experimental 0403005, Economics Working Paper Archive Econ WPA, 2004.
KUJAL, P., SMITH, V. L. The endowment effect. Economics working papers we032256, Universidad Carlos III, Departmento de Economia, 2003.
KUJAL, P., SMITH, V. L. Fairness and short run price adjustment in posted offer markets. Economics working papers we036024, Universidad Carlos III, Departmento de Economia, 2003.
DURHAM, Y., HIRSHLEIFER, J., SMITH, V. L. Experimental tests of the paradox of power. Working papers 741, University of California, Department of Economics, 1995.
BRONFMAN, C., McCABE, K., SMITH, V. L., et al. An experimental examination of the walrasian tatonnement mechanism. Working papers 824, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 1992.
PORTER, D., SMITH, V. L. Price expectations in experimental asset markets with futures contracting. Working papers 827, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 1992.
SMITH, V. L. Can electric power : a „natural monopoly“ – be deregulated? Economics working paper 92,7, University of Arizona, 1991.
SMITH, V. L. Economics of wilderness reresources. Working papers 84, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 1975.
SMITH, V. L. Experimental economics: theory and results. Working papers 73, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 1975.
SMITH, V. L. Recycling and exhaustive reresources. Working papers 50, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 1974.