Roger Bruce Myerson
Americký profesor Roger Bruce Myerson se narodil 29.3.1951 v Bostonu ve státě Massachusetts.
Titul A.B. získal roku 1973 na Harvard University v oboru aplikované matematiky, Ph.D. pak roku 1976 ve stejném oboru tamtéž. V letech 1976 – 2001 přednášel na Northwestern University v Evanstonu a od roku 2001 je profesorem na University of Chicago.
Kromě jiného je Myerson vicepresidentem Econometric Society, členem American Academy of Arts, byl členem redakční rady odborných časopisů Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, aj. Je držitelem čestného doktorátu Universität Basel, Switzerland, autorem několika publikací a mnoha příspěvků do odborných periodik. Je také autorem užitečných softwarových aplikací, kompatibilních se softwarem firmy Microsoft (Formlist.xla, Simtools, xla).
Profesor Myerson je ženatý od roku 1982 s Regina Weber Myerson a má dvě děti, Daniela (*1983) a Rebeccu (*1985).
Ocenění za svou práci v podobě ceny Švédské národní banky za ekonomii na památku Alfreda Nobela (Nobelovu cenu za ekonomii) obdržel R. B. Myerson roku 2007 spolu s dalšími dvěma Američany – L. Hurwiczem a E. Maskinem.
Knihy
MYERSON, R. B. Probability models for economic decisions. Belmont: Thomson, Brooke, Cole, 2005.
MYERSON, R. B. Game theory: Analysis of conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.
Články
BRAGUINSKY, S., MYERSON, R. B. A macroeconomic model of Russian transition. The role of oligarchic property rights. The Economics of Transition, 2007, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 77 – 107.
GERARDI, D., MYERSON, R. B. Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication. Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, vol. 60, no. 1, p. 104 – 134.
MYERSON, R.B. Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007, vol. 136, no. 1, p. 260 – 285.
MYERSON, R. B. Bipolar multicandidate elections with corruption. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006, vol. 108, no. 4, p. 727 – 742.
MYERSON, R. B., WÄRNERYD, K. Population uncertainty in contests. Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 27, no. 2, p. 469.
MYERSON, R. B. Review of „economic effects of constitutions“. Economica, 2005, vol. 72, no. 3, p. 555.
MYERSON, R. B. Political economics and the Weimar disaster. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2004, vol. 160, no. 2, p. 187.
MYERSON, R. B. Comments on „Games with incomplete information played by „Bayesian“ players, I-III“. 2004, vol. 50, no. 12 (Supplement), p. 1818 – 1824.
MYERSON, R. B. Comparison of scoring rules in poisson voting games. Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 103, no. 1, p. 219 – 251.
MYERSON, R. B. Review of „incentives and political economy“. Journal of Economic Literature, 2001, vol. 39, no. 4, p. 1277.
MYERSON, R. B. Economic analysis of constitutions. Law Review, 2000, vol. 67, no. 3, p. 925.
MYERSON, R. B. Large poisson games. Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 94, no. 1, p. 7 – 45.
DIERMEIER, D., MYERSON, R. B. Bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures. American Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89, no. 5, p. 1182 – 1196.
MYERSON, R. B. Nash equilibrium and the history of economic theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 1999, vol. 37, no. 3, p. 1067 – 1082.
MYERSON, R. B. Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems. European Economic Review, 1999, vol. 43, no. 4-6, p. 671 – 697.
MYERSON, R. B. Extended poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem. Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, vol. 25, no. 1, p. 111 – 131.
MYERSON, R. B. Population uncertainty and poisson games. International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, no. 3, p. 375.
MYERSON, R. B. Dual reduction and elementary games. Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, vol. 21, no. 1-2, p. 183 – 202.
MYERSON, R. B. Analysis economico de las institutiones politicas: una introduccion (Economic analysis of political institutions: an introduction with English summary). Cuademos Economicos de I.C.E., 1996, vol. 62, p. 7 – 28.
MYERSON, R. B. John Nash’s contribution to economics. Games and Economic Behavior,
1996, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 287 – 295.
MYERSON, R. B. Analysis of democratic institutions: structure, conduct and performance. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 77 – 89.
MYERSON, R. B. Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption. Social Choice and Welfare, 1995, vol. 12, no, 1, p. 59 – 74.
MYERSON, R. B. Sustainable matching plans with adverse selection. Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 35 – 65.
MYERSON, R. B. Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: a game-theoretic analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 118 – 132.
BANKS, J. S., MYERSON, R. B. Game-theoretic models of politics. Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 1 – 2.
MYERSON, R. B. Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. American Political Science Review, 1993, vol. 87, no. 4, p. 856 – 869.
MYERSON, R. B. Reviews of „Advances in the spatial theory of voting“ and „Models of multiparty electoral competition“. Journal of Economic Literature, 1993, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 237.
MYERSON, R. B., WEBER, R. J. A theory of voting equilibria. American Political Science Review, 1993, vol. 87, no. 1, p. 102 – 114.
MYERSON, R. B., POLLOCK, G. S., SWINKELS, J. M. Viscous population equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, 1991, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 101 – 109.
MYERSON, R. B. Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans. Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, vol. 48, no. 1, p. 264 – 303.
RADNER, R., MYERSON, R. B., MASKIN, E. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria. The Review of Economic Studies, 1986, vol. 53, no. 1, p. 59 – 69.
MYERSON, R. B. Multistage games with communication. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1986, vol. 54, no. 2, p. 323 – 358.
MYERSON, R. B. Two-person bargaining problems with incomplete information. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1984, vol. 52, no. 2, p. 461 – 488.
MYERSON, R. B. A dynamic microeconomic model with durable goods and adaptive expectations. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1983, vol. 4, no. 4, p. 309 – 351.
HOLMSTROM, B., MYERSON, R. B. Efficient and durale decission rules with incomplete information. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1983, vol. 51, no. 6, p. 1799 – 1820.
MYERSON, R. B., SATTERTHWAITE. M. A. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 265 – 281.
MYERSON, R. B. Mechanism design by an informed principal. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1983, vol. 51, no. 6, p. 1767 – 1798.
MYERSON, R. B. Optimal coordination mechanism in generalized principal-agent problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 67 – 81.
BARON, D. P., MYERSON, R. B. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982, vol. 50, no. 4, p. 911 – 930.
MYERSON, R. B. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, vol. 6, p. 58
MYERSON, R. B. Utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and the timing effect in social choice problems. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1981, vol. 49, no. 4, p. 883 – 897.
MYERSON, R. B. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979, vol. 47, no. 1, p. 61 – 74.
MYERSON, R. B., HARSANYI, J. C. Discussion. American Economic Review, 1978, vol. 68, no. 2, p. 231 – 232.
MYERSON, R. B. Economics and ethics: altruism, justice, power: Discussion. American Economic Review, 1978, vol. 68, no. 2, p. 231.
MYERSON, R. B. Threat equilibria and fair settlements in cooperation games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1978, vol. 3, no. 4, p. 265.
MYERSON, R. B. Two-person bargaining problems and comparable utility. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1977, vol. 45, no. 7, p. 1631 – 1637.
Working papers, proceedings, přednášky, aj.
MYERSON, R. B. Economic analysis of constitution. Discussion paper no. 1291, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 2000.
MYERSON, R. B., SATTERTHWAITE, M. A. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. In The Economic Theory of Auctions. Edited by B. Klemperer, Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 2000, p. 399 – 415.
AUMAN, R. J., MYERSON, R. B. Endogenous formation of links between players and of coalitions: An application of the Shapley value. In Collected Papers. Edited by R. J. Axman, Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2000, p. 447 – 463.
MYERSON, R. B. Optimal auction design. In The Economic Theory of Auctions. Edited by P. Klemperer, Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 2000, p. 207 – 222.
BARON, D. P., MYERSON, R. B. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. In Economic Regulation. Cheltenham, Edited by P. L. Joskow, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 2000, p. 290 – 309.
MYERSON, R. B. Informational origins in political bias towards critical groups of voters. Discussion paper no. 1242, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1999.
MYERSON, R. B. Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems. Discussion paper no. 1261, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1999.
MYERSON, R. B. Comparison of scoring rules in poisson voting games. Discussion paper no. 1214, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1998.
MYERSON, R. B. Political economics and the Weimar disaster. Discussion paper no. 1216, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1998.
MYERSON, R. B. Working on game theory: a personal perspective. In Passion and Craft: Economists at Work. Edited by M. Szenberg, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998, p. 227 – 233.
MYERSON, R. B. Economic analysis of political institutions: an introduction. In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress. Edited by D. M. Kreps, K. J. Wallis, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 46 – 65.
MYERSON, R. B. Extended poisson games and the conderced jury theorem. Discussion paper no. 1103, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1997.
MYERSON, R. B. Game-theoretic models of bargaining : An introduction for economists studying the transnational commons. In The Economics of Transnational Commons. Edited by P. Dasgupta, K.-G. Maler, A. Vercelli, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 17 – 34.
MYERSON, R. B. Large poisson games. Discussion paper no. 1189, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1997.
MYERSON, R. B. Population uncertainty and poisson games. Discussion paper 1102R, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1997.
MYERSON, R. B. Sustainable equilibria in culturally familiar games. In Understanding strategic interaction: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten. Edited by W. Albert et al., Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 1997, p. 111 – 121.
MYERSON, R. B. Economic analysis of political institutions: an introduction. Discussion paper no. 1155, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.
MYERSON, R. B. Fundamentals of social choice theory. Discussion paper no. 1162, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.
MYERSON, R. B. John Nash’s contribution to economics. Discussion paper no. 1154, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.
BARON, D. P., MYERSON, R. B. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. In Industrial Organization. Edited by A. Sen, Delhi, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 452 – 476.
MYERSON, R. B. Dual reduction and elementary games. Discussion paper no. 1133, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1995.
DIERMEIER, D., MYERSON, R. B. Lobbying and incentives for legislative organization. Discussion paper no. 1134, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1995.
MYERSON, R. B. Analysis of democratic institutions: structure, conduct, and performance. Discussion paper no. 1095, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.
DIEMEIER, D., MYERSON, R. B. Bargaining, veto power and legislative committees. Discussion paper no. 1089, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.
MYERSON, R. B. Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility. In Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Application. Edited by R. J. Auman, S. Hart, Amsterdam, London and New York: Elsevier North-Holland, 1994, p. 827 – 847.
MYERSON, R. B. Extended poisson games and the condercet jury theorem. Discussion paper no. 1103, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.
MYERSON, R. B. Population uncertainty and poisson games. Discussion paper no. 1102, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.
MYERSON, R. B. Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption. Discussion paper no. 1063, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1993.
MYERSON, R. B. Proportional representation, approval voting, and coalitionally straightforward elections. In Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Edited by W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich, N. J. Schofield, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 107 – 133.
MORTON, R. B., MYERSON, R. B. Campaign spending with impressionable voters. Discussion paper no. 1023, Evanston, Ill.. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1992.
MYERSON, R. B. Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans. In Bargaining with Incomplete Information. Edited by P. B. Linhart, R. Radner, M. A. Satterthwaite, San Diego, London, Sydney and Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Academic Press, 1992, p. 429 – 468.
MYERSON, R. B., SATTERTHWAITE, M. A. Efficient mechanisms in bilateral trading. In Bargaining with Incomplete Information. Edited by P. J. Linhart, R. Radner, M. A. Satterthwaite, San Diego, London, Sydney and Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Academic Press, 1992, p. 40 – 56.
MYERSON, R. B. Incentives to cultivate special interest groups under alternative electoral systems. Discussion paper no 1000, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1992.
MYERSON, R. B. Analysis of incentives in bargaining and mediation. In Negotiation Analysis. Edited by P. H. Young, Ann Arbor: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991, p. 67 – 85.
MYERSON, R. B. Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption:
A game-theoretic analysis. Discussion paper no. 956, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991.
MYERSON, R. B. Proportional representation, approval voting, and coalitionally straightforward elections. Discussion paper no. 928, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991.
MYERSON, R. B. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. In Game Theory in Econonomics. Edited by A. Rubinstein, Aldershot, U.K. and Brookfield, Vt.: Elgar, 1990, p. 526 – 538.
MYERSON, R. B. Fictious-transfer solutions in cooperative game theory. Discussion paper no. 907, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1990.
MYERSON, R. B. Optimal auction design. In Game Theory in Economics. Edited by A. Rubinstein, Aldershot, U.K. and Brookfield, Vt.: Elgar, 1990, p. 492 – 507.
MYERSON, R. B., POLLOCK, G. B., SWINKELS, J. Viscous population equilibria. Discussion paper no. 906, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1990.
AUMANN, R. J., MYERSON, R. B. Endogenous formation of links between players and coalitions: an application of the Shapley value. Technical Report no. 524, Stanford, Calif.: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Science, Stanford University, 1998.
MYERSON, R. B. Mechanism design. Discussion paper no. 796. Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.
MYERSON, R. B., WEBER, R. J. A theory of voting equilibria. Discussion paper no. 782, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.
MYERSON, R. B. Dynamic matching problems with incentive constraints. Discussion paper no. 721, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1987.
MYERSON, R. B. Axiomatic foundations of Bayesian decision theory. Working paper no. 671, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1986.
MYERSON, R. B. Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans. Working paper no. 691, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1986.
MYERSON, R. B. Negotiation in games: A theoretical overview. In Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow. Edited by W. P. Keller, R. M. Starr, D. A. Starrett, Cambridge, New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 3 – 24.
MYERSON, R. B. Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information. In Game-theoretic models of bargaining. Edited by A. E. Roth, Cambridge, New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p, 115 – 147.
MYERSON, R. B. Bayesian equilibrium and incentive –compatibility: an introduction, In Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner. Edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, H. Sonnenschein, Cambridge, New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 229 – 259.
MYERSON, R. B. Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria. Discussion paper no. 591, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1984.
MYERSON, R. B. An introduction to game theory. Discussion paper no. 823, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1984.
MYERSON, R. B. Multistage games with communication. Discussion paper no. 590, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1984.
MYERSON, R. B. Sequential correlated equilibria of multistage games. Discussion paper no. 412, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1984.
MYERSON, R. B. Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information. Discussion paper no. 582, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestwern University, 1983.
MYERSON, R. B. Bayesian equilibrium and incentive-compatibility: an introduction. Discussion paper no. 548, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1983.
MYERSON, R. B. Cooperative games with incomplete information, Discussion paper no. 528, Evanston, Ill.. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1982.
MYERSON, R. B. Two-person bargaining problems with incomplete information. Discussion paper no. 527, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1982.
HOLMSTROM, B., MYERSON, R. B. Efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information. Discussion paper no. 495, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1981.
MYERSON, R. B., SATTERTHWAITE, M. A. Efficient mechanisms of bilateral trading. Discussion paper no. 469, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1981.
MYERSON, R. B. Mechanism design by an informed principal. Discussion paper no. 481, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1981.
MYERSON, R. B. A general theory of cooperative solutions for games with incomplete information. Discussion paper no. 433, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1980.
MYERSON, R. B. Optimal coordination mechanism in principal-agent problems. Discussion paper no. 429, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1980.
MYERSON, R. B. Solutions for two-person bargaining problems with incomplete information. Discussion paper no. 432, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1980.
MYERSON, R. B. A dynamic microeconomic model with durable goods and and adaptive expectations. Discussion paper no. 381, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1979.
BARON, D. P., MYERSON, R. B. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Discussion paper no. 412, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1979.
MYERSON, R. B. An axiomatic derivation of subjective probability. Discussion paper no. 338, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1978.
MYERSON, R. B. Conference structures and fair allocation rules. Discussion paper no. 336, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1978.
MYERSON, R. B. Linearity, concavity, and scale invariance in social choice functions. Discussion paper no. 321, Evanston, Ill.: Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1978.
MYERSON, R. B. Optimal auction desig. Discussion paper no. 362, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1978.
MYERSON, R. B. Prices and market imbalance indexes in a general equilibrium model. Discussion paper no. 339, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1978.
MYERSON, R. B. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problems. Discussion paper no. 264, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1977.
KALAI, E., MYERSON, R. B. Linear functionals of convex sets with application to economics. Discussion paper no. 272, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1977.
MYERSON, R. B. Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. Discussion paper no. 295, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1977.
MYERSON, R. B. Threat equilibria and fair settlements in cooperative games. Discussion paper no. 288, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1977.
KALAI, E., MYERSON, R. B. Values of games without sidepayments. Discussion paper no. 267, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1977.
MYERSON, R. B. An extension of the Kakutani fixed point theorem. Discussion paper no. 245, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1976.
MYERSON, R. B. Graphs and cooperation in games. Discussion paper no. 246, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1976.
MYERSON, R. B. A theory of cooperative games. Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976.
MYERSON, R. B. Two-person bargaining problems and comparable utility. Discussion paper no. 247, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1976.
MYERSON, R. B. Value of games in partition function form. Discussion paper no. 244, Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1976.