Oliver Hart

Oliver Hart se narodil 9. října 1948 v Británii. Jeho rodiče jsou Židé, přičemž jeho otec pochází ze šlechtické rodiny. Je vnukem Samuela Montaga (1832 – 1911), prvního barona ze Swaythlingu, liberálního poslance a zakladatele banky Samuel Montagu & Co., která je dnes součástí HSBC.

Hart získal v roce 1969 titul B.A. v matematice na King’s College v Cambridgi. Dále získal v roce 1972 titul M.A. v ekonomii na University of Warwick a Ph.D. v ekonomii na  Princeton University v roce 1974. Po ukončení svých studiích byl nejprve přednášejícím na Churchill College v Cambridgi a poté se stal profesorem na London Scool of Economics. V roce 1984 se vrátil do Spojených států, kde začal učit na Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Od roku 1993 učí na Harvard University. V letech 2000 až 2003 byl vedoucím ekonomického oddělení univerzity. Je členem mnoha vědeckých společností, například Americké akademie umění a věd nebo Britské akademie, a držitelem několika čestných doktorátů.

Oliver Hart je expertem v oblasti teorie smluv, teorie filmu, korporátních financí a v oboru právo a ekonomie. Ve svém výzkumu se zabývá především rolí vlastnické struktury a smluvních dohod a jejich vlivu na vedení korporací. Dvakrát vystoupil jako vládní expert v soudních sporech s velkými korporacemi.

Za své dílo v oblasti teorie smluv byl v roce 2016 oceněn Nobelovou cenou za ekonomii.

Oliver Hart má americké občanství. Jeho manželkou je Rita. B. Goldbergová, profesorka literatury na Harvardu, mají spolu dva syny.

Knihy

HART, Oliver, 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure[online]. New York: Oxford University Press, USA. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/firms-contracts-and-financial-structure
HART, Oliver, 1998. Imprese, contratti e struttura finanziaria. Milano: Giuffrè. ISBN 978-88-14-06767-9.
HART, Oliver, 2007. Hold-up, asset ownership, and preference points. Discussion paper (Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)), č. 7298. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
HART, Oliver a HARVARD INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2001. Norms and the theory of the firm.Discussion paper series, 1923. Cambridge: Harvard University.
HART, Oliver a Economics JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW and Business, 2001. Financial contrating. Discussion paper series, č.327. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School.
HART, Oliver, John Hardman MOORE, UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 1998. Foundations of incomplete contracts.Discussion paper series, no 9816. B.m.: University of St. Andrews, Department of Economics.
HART, Oliver, John MOORE a HARVARD INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2004. Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in.Discussion paper series, 2032. Cambridge: Harvard University.
HART, Oliver, John MOORE a Economics JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW and Business, 2006. Contracts as reference points. Discussion paper series, 572. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School.
HART, Oliver a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2011. Noncontractible investments and reference points. Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), č. W16929. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2011. Inefficient provision of liquidity. Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research; Financial economics. London: CEPR.
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2014. Banks are where the liquidity is. Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research; Financial economics; Discussion paper, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 10017. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
HART, Oliver, Luigi ZINGALES a CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH (GREAT BRITAIN), 2009. A new capital regulation for large financial institutions. Discussion paper (Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)), č. 7298. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
HART, Oliver, Luigi ZINGALES a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2013. Liquidity and inefficient investment. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Články

BOREK, Christopher, Angelo FRATTARELLI a Oliver HART, 2014. Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine. Journal of Law and Economics. 57(4), 975–1000.
FEHR, Ernst, Oliver HART a Christian ZEHNDER, 2015. How Do Informal Agreements and Revision Shape Contractual Reference Points? Journal of the European Economic Association[online]. 13(1), 1–28. Dostupné z: doi:10.1111/jeea.12098
GROSSMAN, S. J. a O. D. HART, 1980a. Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids. The Journal of Finance[online]. 35(2), 323–334. ISSN 1540-6261. Dostupné z: doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02161.x
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1979. A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies. Econometrica[online]. 47(2), 293–329. ISSN 0012-9682. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/1914186
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1980b. Take-over Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation. The Bell Journal of Economics[online]. 11(1), 42–64. ISSN 0361-915X. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/3003400
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1981a. Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment. The American Economic Review. 71(2), 301–307. ISSN 0002-8282.
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1981b. The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information. The Journal of Finance[online]. 36(2), 253–270. ISSN 1540-6261. Dostupné z: doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00438.x
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1983a. An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica[online]. 51(1), 7–45. ISSN 0012-9682. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/1912246
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1983b. Implicit Contracts Under Asymmetric Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online]. 98, 123–156. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/1885377
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy[online]. 94(4), 691–719. ISSN 0022-3808. Dostupné z: doi:10.1086/261404
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1988. One share-one vote and the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics[online]. 20, The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors, 175–202. ISSN 0304-405X. Dostupné z: doi:10.1016/0304-405X(88)90044-X
GROSSMAN, Sanford J., Oliver D. HART a Eric S. MASKIN, 1983. Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks. Journal of Political Economy[online]. 91(6), 907–928. ISSN 0022-3808. Dostupné z: doi:10.1086/261193
GUESNERIE, Roger a Oliver HART, 1985. Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry. International Economic Review[online]. 26(3), 525–545. ISSN 0020-6598. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/2526701
HART, Oliver, 1982a. A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features. The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online]. 97(1), 109–138. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/1882629
HART, Oliver, 1989a. An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm. Columbia Law Review[online]. 89(7), 1757–1774. ISSN 0010-1958. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/1122818
HART, Oliver, 1989b. Bargaining and Strikes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online]. 104(1), 25–43. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/2937833
HART, Oliver, 1990. Is „Bounded Rationality“ an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft. 146(4), 696–702. ISSN 0932-4569.
HART, Oliver, 1993. An Economist´s View of Fiduciary Duty. University of Toronto Law Journal. 43, 299–313.
HART, Oliver, 1996. An Economist´s View of Authority. Rationality and Society. 8(4), 371–386.
HART, Oliver, 1999a. Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications,“The Economic Journal“. The Economic Journal. 105, 678–689.
HART, Oliver, 1999b. Governance, Equity and Global Markets. In: Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics in Europe[online]. B.m.: Paris: La Docmentation Francaise, 2000. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/different-approaches-bankruptcy
HART, Oliver, 2001a. Financial Contracting. Journal of Economic Literature. 34(4), 1079–1100.
HART, Oliver, 2001b. Norms and the Theory of the Firm. University of Pennsylvania Law Review[online]. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/norms-and-theory-firm
HART, Oliver, 2003. Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships. Economic Journal. 113(486), C69–C76.
HART, Oliver, 2008. Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm. Economica[online]. 75(299), 404–411. Dostupné z: doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00659.x
HART, Oliver, 2009a. Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points. The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online]. 124(1), 267–300. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.267
HART, Oliver, 2009b. Regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley. Journal of Accounting Research[online]. 47(2), 437–445. Dostupné z: doi:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2009.00329.x
HART, Oliver, 2011. Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber’s „The Theory of the Firm“. Journal of Economic Literature[online]. 49(1), 101–113. Dostupné z: doi:10.1257/jel.49.1.101
HART, Oliver, 2013. Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points. Games[online]. 4(3), 437–456. Dostupné z: doi:10.3390/g4030437
HART, Oliver, P. AGHION a J. MOORE, 1992. The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization[online]. 8(3). Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/economics-bankruptcy-reform
HART, Oliver, P. AGHION a J. MOORE, 1993. A Proposal for Bankruptcy Reform in the U.K. Insolvency Law & Practice. 9(4), 103–108.
HART, Oliver, P. AGHION a J. MOORE, 1994. Improving Bankruptcy Procedure. Washington University Law Quarterly. 72(3), 849–872.
HART, Oliver, P. AGHION a J. MOORE, 1995. Insolvency Reform in the U.K.: A Revised Proposal. Insolvency Law and Practice. 11, 4–11.
HART, Oliver a Lucian BEBCHUCK, 2001. Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control. Discussion Paper[online]. (336). ISSN 1045-6333. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/takeover-bids-vs-proxy-fights-contests-corporate-control
HART, Oliver D, 1974. On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model. Journal of Economic Theory[online]. 9(3), 293–311. ISSN 0022-0531. Dostupné z: doi:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90054-4
HART, Oliver D, 1975. On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete. Journal of Economic Theory[online]. 11(3), 418–443. ISSN 0022-0531. Dostupné z: doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90028-9
HART, Oliver D., 1977a. On the Profitability of Speculation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online]. 91(4), 579–597. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/1885883
HART, Oliver D, 1977b. Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory[online]. 16(1), 53–83. ISSN 0022-0531. Dostupné z: doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90123-5
HART, Oliver D., 1979a. Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities. The Review of Economic Studies[online]. 46(1), 1–30. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/2297169
HART, Oliver D., 1979b. On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies. Econometrica[online]. 47(5), 1057–1083. ISSN 0012-9682. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/1911950
HART, Oliver D, 1980. Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation. Journal of Economic Theory[online]. 22(2), 279–312. ISSN 0022-0531. Dostupné z: doi:10.1016/0022-0531(80)90044-7
HART, Oliver D., 1982b. Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities: A Correction. The Review of Economic Studies[online]. 49(2), 313–314. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/2297278
HART, Oliver D., 1983a. Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction. The Review of Economic Studies[online]. 50(1), 3–35. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/2296952
HART, Oliver D., 1983b. The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme. The Bell Journal of Economics[online]. 14(2), 366–382. ISSN 0361-915X. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/3003639
HART, Oliver D., 1985a. Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: A General Model. The Review of Economic Studies[online]. 52(4), 529–546. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/2297730
HART, Oliver D., 1985b. Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results. The Economic Journal[online]. 95(380), 889–908. ISSN 0013-0133. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/2233255
HART, Oliver D., 1988a. Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations. The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d’Economique[online]. 21(3), 467–476. ISSN 0008-4085. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/135432
HART, Oliver D., 1988b. Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 4(1), 119–139. ISSN 8756-6222.
HART, Oliver D. a Dwight M. JAFFEE, 1974. On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries. The Review of Economic Studies[online]. 41(1), 129–147. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/2296404
HART, Oliver D. a David M. KREPS, 1986. Price Destabilizing Speculation. Journal of Political Economy[online]. 94(5), 927–952. ISSN 0022-3808. Dostupné z: doi:10.1086/261418
HART, Oliver D. a Harold W. KUHN, 1975. A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption. Journal of Mathematical Economics[online]. 2(3), 335–343. ISSN 0304-4068. Dostupné z: doi:10.1016/0304-4068(75)90001-4
HART, Oliver D. a Jean TIROLE, 1988. Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics. The Review of Economic Studies[online]. 55(4), 509–540. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/2297403
HART, Oliver, Simeon DJANKOV, Caralee MCLIESH a Andrei SHLEIFER, 2008. Debt Enforcement Around the World. Journal of Political Economy. 116(6), 1105–1149.
HART, Oliver, La Porta DRAGO, F. LOPEZ-DE-SILANES a J. MOORE, 1997a. A New Bankruptcy Procedure That Uses Multiple Auctions. European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. 41(3–5), 461–473.
HART, Oliver, Ernst FEHR a Christian ZEHNDER, 2009. Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition – Behavioral Consequences of the Fundamental Transformation. Journal of the European Economic Association. 7(2–3), 561–572.
HART, Oliver, Ernst FEHR a Christian ZEHNDER, 2011. Contracts as Reference Points-Experimental Evidence. American Economic Review[online]. 101(2), 493–525. Dostupné z: doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.493
HART, Oliver a Bengt HOLMSTROM, 2010. A Theory of Firm Scope. The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online]. 125(2), 483–513. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.2.483
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1990. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy[online]. 98(6). Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/property-rights-and-nature-firm
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1994. A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 109(4), 841–879.
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1995. Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management. American Economic Review. 85(3), 567–585.
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1996. The Governance of Exchanges: Members´ Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 12(4), 53–69.
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1998a. Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 113(1), 1–41.
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1999. Foundations of Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economic Studies. 66(1), 115–138.
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 2005. On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization. Journal of Political Economy. 113(4), 675–702.
HART, Oliver a John MOORE, 1988. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica[online]. 56(4), 755–785. ISSN 0012-9682. Dostupné z: doi:10.2307/1912698
HART, Oliver a John MOORE, 1998b. Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership[online]. 6421. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/cooperatives-vs-outside-ownership
HART, Oliver a John MOORE, 2007. Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New Thoughts. American Economic Review. 97(2), 182–186.
HART, Oliver a John MOORE, 2008. Contracts as Reference Points. Quarterly Journal of Economics. CXXIII(1), 1–48.
HART, Oliver, A. SHLEIFER a R. W. VISHNY, 1997b. The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 112(4), 1126–1161.
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2008. Economists Have Abandoned Principle. Wall Street Journal[online]. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/economists-have-abandoned-principle
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2009. How the Tricks that Crashed Wall Street Can Save the World. Foreign Polici[online]. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/how-tricks-crashed-wall-street-can-save-world
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2010a. “Curbing Risk on Wall Street”. National Affairs. (3), 20–34.
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2010b. How to Make a Distressed Bank Raise Equity. Financial Times[online]. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/how-make-distressed-bank-raise-equity
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2011. A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions. American Law and Economics Review[online]. 13(2), 453–490. Dostupné z: doi:10.1093/aler/ahr001
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2015. Liquidity and Inefficient Investment. Journal of the European Economic Association[online]. 13(5), 737–769. Dostupné z: doi:10.1111/jeea.12130

Working papers, proceedings, přednášky, aj.

BOREK, Christopher, Angelo FRATTARELLI a Oliver HART, 2013. Tax shelters and the theory of the firm. VoxEU.org[online]. [vid. 2017-04-20]. Dostupné z: http://voxeu.org/article/tax-shelters-and-theory-firm
HALONEN-AKATWIJUKA, Maija a Oliver HART, 2015. Continuing Contracts[online]. Bristol Economics Discussion Paper 15/665. B.m.: Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK [vid. 2017-04-05]. Dostupné z: https://ideas.repec.org/p/bri/uobdis/15-665.html
HART, Oliver, 1999. Governance, Equity and Global Markets. In: Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics in Europe[online]. B.m.: Paris: La Docmentation Francaise, 2000. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/different-approaches-bankruptcy
HART, Oliver a Maija HALONEN-AKATWIJUKA, 2013. More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts[online]. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/more-less-why-parties-may-deliberately-write-incomplete-contracts
HART, Oliver a John MOORE, 1998. Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership[online]. 6421. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/cooperatives-vs-outside-ownership
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2009. To Regulate Finance, Try the Market. Foreign polici[online]. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/regulate-finance-try-market
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2010. “Curbing Risk on Wall Street”. National Affairs. (3), 20–34.
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2014. Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is[online]. Dostupné z: http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/banks-are-where-liquidity
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Oliver Hart