HART, Oliver, 1995.
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure[online]. New York: Oxford University Press, USA. Dostupné z:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/firms-contracts-and-financial-structure
HART, Oliver, 1998. Imprese, contratti e struttura finanziaria. Milano: Giuffrè. ISBN 978-88-14-06767-9.
HART, Oliver, 2007. Hold-up, asset ownership, and preference points. Discussion paper (Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)), č. 7298. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
HART, Oliver a HARVARD INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2001. Norms and the theory of the firm.Discussion paper series, 1923. Cambridge: Harvard University.
HART, Oliver a Economics JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW and Business, 2001. Financial contrating. Discussion paper series, č.327. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School.
HART, Oliver, John Hardman MOORE, UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 1998. Foundations of incomplete contracts.Discussion paper series, no 9816. B.m.: University of St. Andrews, Department of Economics.
HART, Oliver, John MOORE a HARVARD INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2004. Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in.Discussion paper series, 2032. Cambridge: Harvard University.
HART, Oliver, John MOORE a Economics JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW and Business, 2006. Contracts as reference points. Discussion paper series, 572. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School.
HART, Oliver a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2011. Noncontractible investments and reference points. Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), č. W16929. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2011. Inefficient provision of liquidity. Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research; Financial economics. London: CEPR.
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2014. Banks are where the liquidity is. Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research; Financial economics; Discussion paper, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 10017. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
HART, Oliver, Luigi ZINGALES a CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH (GREAT BRITAIN), 2009. A new capital regulation for large financial institutions. Discussion paper (Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)), č. 7298. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
HART, Oliver, Luigi ZINGALES a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2013. Liquidity and inefficient investment. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
BOREK, Christopher, Angelo FRATTARELLI a Oliver HART, 2014. Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine. Journal of Law and Economics. 57(4), 975–1000.
FEHR, Ernst, Oliver HART a Christian ZEHNDER, 2015. How Do Informal Agreements and Revision Shape Contractual Reference Points?
Journal of the European Economic Association[online].
13(1), 1–28. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1111/jeea.12098
GROSSMAN, S. J. a O. D. HART, 1980a. Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids.
The Journal of Finance[online].
35(2), 323–334. ISSN 1540-6261. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02161.x
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1979. A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies.
Econometrica[online].
47(2), 293–329. ISSN 0012-9682. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/1914186
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1980b. Take-over Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation.
The Bell Journal of Economics[online].
11(1), 42–64. ISSN 0361-915X. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/3003400
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1981a. Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment. The American Economic Review. 71(2), 301–307. ISSN 0002-8282.
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1981b. The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information.
The Journal of Finance[online].
36(2), 253–270. ISSN 1540-6261. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00438.x
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1983a. An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem.
Econometrica[online].
51(1), 7–45. ISSN 0012-9682. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/1912246
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1983b. Implicit Contracts Under Asymmetric Information.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online].
98, 123–156. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/1885377
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.
Journal of Political Economy[online].
94(4), 691–719. ISSN 0022-3808. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1086/261404
GROSSMAN, Sanford J. a Oliver D. HART, 1988. One share-one vote and the market for corporate control.
Journal of Financial Economics[online].
20, The Distribution of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors, 175–202. ISSN 0304-405X. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1016/0304-405X(88)90044-X
GROSSMAN, Sanford J., Oliver D. HART a Eric S. MASKIN, 1983. Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks.
Journal of Political Economy[online].
91(6), 907–928. ISSN 0022-3808. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1086/261193
GUESNERIE, Roger a Oliver HART, 1985. Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry.
International Economic Review[online].
26(3), 525–545. ISSN 0020-6598. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/2526701
HART, Oliver, 1982a. A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online].
97(1), 109–138. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/1882629
HART, Oliver, 1989a. An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm.
Columbia Law Review[online].
89(7), 1757–1774. ISSN 0010-1958. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/1122818
HART, Oliver, 1989b. Bargaining and Strikes.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online].
104(1), 25–43. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/2937833
HART, Oliver, 1990. Is „Bounded Rationality“ an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft. 146(4), 696–702. ISSN 0932-4569.
HART, Oliver, 1993. An Economist´s View of Fiduciary Duty. University of Toronto Law Journal. 43, 299–313.
HART, Oliver, 1996. An Economist´s View of Authority. Rationality and Society. 8(4), 371–386.
HART, Oliver, 1999a. Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications,“The Economic Journal“. The Economic Journal. 105, 678–689.
HART, Oliver, 1999b. Governance, Equity and Global Markets. In:
Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics in Europe[online]. B.m.: Paris: La Docmentation Francaise, 2000. Dostupné z:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/different-approaches-bankruptcy
HART, Oliver, 2001a. Financial Contracting. Journal of Economic Literature. 34(4), 1079–1100.
HART, Oliver, 2001b. Norms and the Theory of the Firm.
University of Pennsylvania Law Review[online]. Dostupné z:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/norms-and-theory-firm
HART, Oliver, 2003. Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships. Economic Journal. 113(486), C69–C76.
HART, Oliver, 2008. Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm.
Economica[online].
75(299), 404–411. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00659.x
HART, Oliver, 2009a. Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online].
124(1), 267–300. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.267
HART, Oliver, 2009b. Regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley.
Journal of Accounting Research[online].
47(2), 437–445. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1111/j.1475-679X.2009.00329.x
HART, Oliver, 2011. Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber’s „The Theory of the Firm“.
Journal of Economic Literature[online].
49(1), 101–113. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1257/jel.49.1.101
HART, Oliver, 2013. Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points.
Games[online].
4(3), 437–456. Dostupné z: doi:
10.3390/g4030437
HART, Oliver, P. AGHION a J. MOORE, 1992. The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform.
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization[online].
8(3). Dostupné z:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/economics-bankruptcy-reform
HART, Oliver, P. AGHION a J. MOORE, 1993. A Proposal for Bankruptcy Reform in the U.K. Insolvency Law & Practice. 9(4), 103–108.
HART, Oliver, P. AGHION a J. MOORE, 1994. Improving Bankruptcy Procedure. Washington University Law Quarterly. 72(3), 849–872.
HART, Oliver, P. AGHION a J. MOORE, 1995. Insolvency Reform in the U.K.: A Revised Proposal. Insolvency Law and Practice. 11, 4–11.
HART, Oliver a Lucian BEBCHUCK, 2001. Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control.
Discussion Paper[online]. (336). ISSN 1045-6333. Dostupné z:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/takeover-bids-vs-proxy-fights-contests-corporate-control
HART, Oliver D, 1974. On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model.
Journal of Economic Theory[online].
9(3), 293–311. ISSN 0022-0531. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1016/0022-0531(74)90054-4
HART, Oliver D, 1975. On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete.
Journal of Economic Theory[online].
11(3), 418–443. ISSN 0022-0531. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1016/0022-0531(75)90028-9
HART, Oliver D., 1977a. On the Profitability of Speculation.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online].
91(4), 579–597. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/1885883
HART, Oliver D, 1977b. Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium.
Journal of Economic Theory[online].
16(1), 53–83. ISSN 0022-0531. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1016/0022-0531(77)90123-5
HART, Oliver D., 1979a. Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities.
The Review of Economic Studies[online].
46(1), 1–30. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/2297169
HART, Oliver D., 1979b. On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies.
Econometrica[online].
47(5), 1057–1083. ISSN 0012-9682. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/1911950
HART, Oliver D, 1980. Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation.
Journal of Economic Theory[online].
22(2), 279–312. ISSN 0022-0531. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1016/0022-0531(80)90044-7
HART, Oliver D., 1982b. Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities: A Correction.
The Review of Economic Studies[online].
49(2), 313–314. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/2297278
HART, Oliver D., 1983a. Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction.
The Review of Economic Studies[online].
50(1), 3–35. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/2296952
HART, Oliver D., 1983b. The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme.
The Bell Journal of Economics[online].
14(2), 366–382. ISSN 0361-915X. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/3003639
HART, Oliver D., 1985a. Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: A General Model.
The Review of Economic Studies[online].
52(4), 529–546. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/2297730
HART, Oliver D., 1985b. Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results.
The Economic Journal[online].
95(380), 889–908. ISSN 0013-0133. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/2233255
HART, Oliver D., 1988a. Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations.
The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d’Economique[online].
21(3), 467–476. ISSN 0008-4085. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/135432
HART, Oliver D., 1988b. Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 4(1), 119–139. ISSN 8756-6222.
HART, Oliver D. a Dwight M. JAFFEE, 1974. On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries.
The Review of Economic Studies[online].
41(1), 129–147. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/2296404
HART, Oliver D. a David M. KREPS, 1986. Price Destabilizing Speculation.
Journal of Political Economy[online].
94(5), 927–952. ISSN 0022-3808. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1086/261418
HART, Oliver D. a Harold W. KUHN, 1975. A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption.
Journal of Mathematical Economics[online].
2(3), 335–343. ISSN 0304-4068. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1016/0304-4068(75)90001-4
HART, Oliver D. a Jean TIROLE, 1988. Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics.
The Review of Economic Studies[online].
55(4), 509–540. ISSN 0034-6527. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/2297403
HART, Oliver, Simeon DJANKOV, Caralee MCLIESH a Andrei SHLEIFER, 2008. Debt Enforcement Around the World. Journal of Political Economy. 116(6), 1105–1149.
HART, Oliver, La Porta DRAGO, F. LOPEZ-DE-SILANES a J. MOORE, 1997a. A New Bankruptcy Procedure That Uses Multiple Auctions. European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. 41(3–5), 461–473.
HART, Oliver, Ernst FEHR a Christian ZEHNDER, 2009. Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition – Behavioral Consequences of the Fundamental Transformation. Journal of the European Economic Association. 7(2–3), 561–572.
HART, Oliver, Ernst FEHR a Christian ZEHNDER, 2011. Contracts as Reference Points-Experimental Evidence.
American Economic Review[online].
101(2), 493–525. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1257/aer.101.2.493
HART, Oliver a Bengt HOLMSTROM, 2010. A Theory of Firm Scope.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics[online].
125(2), 483–513. ISSN 0033-5533. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1162/qjec.2010.125.2.483
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1990. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.
Journal of Political Economy[online].
98(6). Dostupné z:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/property-rights-and-nature-firm
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1994. A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 109(4), 841–879.
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1995. Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management. American Economic Review. 85(3), 567–585.
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1996. The Governance of Exchanges: Members´ Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 12(4), 53–69.
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1998a. Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 113(1), 1–41.
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 1999. Foundations of Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economic Studies. 66(1), 115–138.
HART, Oliver a J. MOORE, 2005. On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization. Journal of Political Economy. 113(4), 675–702.
HART, Oliver a John MOORE, 1988. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation.
Econometrica[online].
56(4), 755–785. ISSN 0012-9682. Dostupné z: doi:
10.2307/1912698
HART, Oliver a John MOORE, 1998b.
Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership[online]. 6421. Dostupné z:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/cooperatives-vs-outside-ownership
HART, Oliver a John MOORE, 2007. Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New Thoughts. American Economic Review. 97(2), 182–186.
HART, Oliver a John MOORE, 2008. Contracts as Reference Points. Quarterly Journal of Economics. CXXIII(1), 1–48.
HART, Oliver, A. SHLEIFER a R. W. VISHNY, 1997b. The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 112(4), 1126–1161.
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2008. Economists Have Abandoned Principle.
Wall Street Journal[online]. Dostupné z:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/economists-have-abandoned-principle
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2009. How the Tricks that Crashed Wall Street Can Save the World.
Foreign Polici[online]. Dostupné z:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/how-tricks-crashed-wall-street-can-save-world
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2010a. “Curbing Risk on Wall Street”. National Affairs. (3), 20–34.
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2010b. How to Make a Distressed Bank Raise Equity.
Financial Times[online]. Dostupné z:
http://scholar.harvard.edu/hart/publications/how-make-distressed-bank-raise-equity
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2011. A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions.
American Law and Economics Review[online].
13(2), 453–490. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1093/aler/ahr001
HART, Oliver a Luigi ZINGALES, 2015. Liquidity and Inefficient Investment.
Journal of the European Economic Association[online].
13(5), 737–769. Dostupné z: doi:
10.1111/jeea.12130