Lloyd Stowell Shapley
Jak uvedl Výbor pro udělování Nobelovy ceny při Švédské akademii, bylo toto ocenění v roce 2012 uděleno za vynikající příklad ekonomického inženýrství, konkrétně za „teorii stabilních alokací a praktické návrhy podoby trhů“.
Jedním ze dvou oceněných amerických ekonomů byl Lloyd Stowell Shapley, narozený 2. června 1923 v Cambridge, Massachusetts v rodině známého astronoma. Zde zřejmě vznikl jeho velký zájem o matematiku, kterou začal studovat na Harvardu. Odtud však v roce 1943 během studií odchází do armády. Za své zásluhy (především rozluštění japonského meteorologického kódu) byl roku 1944 vyznamenán medailí Bronzová hvězda. Po ukončení II. světové války se vrací na Harvard a roku 1948 získává AB v oboru matematika. Rok pracuje v RANDu a odchází na Princeton University, kde získává roku 1953 titul Ph.D. (matematika). Následuje návrat do RANDu a od roku 1981 se Shapley stává profesorem na University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA).
Ve svých pracech se Shapley zabývá zejména teorií her, studiem a přiřazovacími postupy. Vyvinul např. algoritmus, zajišťující vždy stabilní párování. V praxi to pak například znamená, že noví lékaři mohou být vhodně přiřazeni k nemocnicím, studenti ke školám a dárci ledvin k příjemcům transplantací. Známý je též tzv. Galeův-Shapleyho algoritmus neboli „problém stabilních manželství“, kdy abstraktní algoritmus při volbě partnera umožňuje možnost volby, a to nejlepší možné.
Lloyd Shapley i ve svých letech působí v mnoha organizacích. Je mj. členem Econometric Society, členem American Academy of Arts and Sciences, působí v INFORMS, je čestným členem American Economic Association. Získal čestný doktorát na Hebrew University of Jerusalem, je držitelem John von Neumann Theory Prize (1981).
L. S. Shapley je od roku 1955 ženatý s Marian Ludolph, se kterou má dva syny – Petera a Christophera.
Knihy
Statistics, probability and game theory: Papers in honor of David Blackwell. Edited by T. S. Ferguson, L. S. Shapley, J. B. MacQueen. Hayward, CA: Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 1966.
Advances in game theory. Edited by M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, A. W. Tucker. Princeton: Princeton University, 1964.
Články
HU, X., SHAPLEY, L. S. On authority distribution in organizations: equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior, Oct. 2003, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 132 – 152.
HU, X., SHAPLEY, L. S. On authority distributions in organizations: controls. Games and Economic Behavior, Oct. 2003, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 153 – 170.
RULNICK, J. M., SHAPLEY, L. S. Convex covers of symmetric games. International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 26, no. 4, p. 561 – 577.
LEVY, A., SHAPLEY, L. S. Individual and collective wage bargaining. International Economic Review, Nov. 1997, vol. 38, no. 4, p. 969 – 991.
MONDERER, D., SHAPLEY, L. S. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, Jan. 1996, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 68, no. 1, p. 258 – 265.
MONDERER, D., SHAPLEY, L. S. Fictitious play property for games with identical interests. Journal of Economic Theory, Jan. 1996, vol. 68, no. 1, p. 258 – 265.
DUBEY, P., SHAPLEY, L. S. Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: Two models. Journal of Mathematical Economics. May 1994, vol. 23, no. 3, p. 253 – 293.
MONDERER, D., SAMET, D., SHAPLEY, L. S. Weighted values and the core. International Journal of Game Theory, 1992, vol. 21, no. 1, p. 27 – 39.
SHAPLEY, L. S., VOHRA, R. On Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, the K-K-M-S theorem and the core of a balanced game. Economic Theory, Jan. 1989, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 108 – 116.
OWEN, G., SHAPLEY, L. S. Optimal location of candidates in ideological space. International Journal of Game Theory, 1989, vol. 18, no. 3, p. 339 – 356.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SHUBIK, M. An example of a trading economy with three competitive equilibria. Journal of Political Economy, Aug. 1977, vol. 85, no. 4, p. 873 – 875.
SHAPLEY, L. S. Lotteries and menus: A comment on unbounded utilities. Journal of Economic Theory, Apr. 1977, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 446 – 453.
SHAPLEY, L. S. The St. Petersburg paradox: A con games? Journal of Economic Theory, Apr. 1977, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 439 – 442.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SHUBIK, M. Trade using one commodity as a means of payment. Journal of Political Economy, Oct. 1977, vol. 85, no. 5, p. 937 – 968.
SHAPLEY, L. S. An example of slow-converging core. International Economic Review, June 1975, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 345 – 351.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SCARF, H. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics, March 1974, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 23 – 37.
SHAPLEY, L. S. Let’s block „block.“ Econometrica, Nov. 1973, vol. 41, no. 6, p. 1201 – 1202.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SHUBIK, M. Pure competition, coalitional power, and fair division. International Economic Review, Oct. 1969, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 337 – 362.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SHUBIK, M. On the core of an economic system with externalities. American Economic Review, 1969, Part I Se, vol. 59, no. 4, p. 678 – 684.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SHUBIK, M. On market games. Journal of Economic Theory, June 1969, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 9 – 25.
SHAPLEY, L. S. Simple games: an outline of the descriptive theory. Behavioral Science, 1962, vol. 7, p. 59 – 66.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SHUBIK, M. A method for evaluating the distribution of the power in a commitee system. American Political Science Review, 1954, vol. 48, p. 787 – 792.
Working papers, proceedings, přednášky, aj.
QIN, C.-Z., SHAPLEY, L. S. Marshallian money, welfare, and side-payments. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1729, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, 2009.
QIN, C.-Z., SHAPLEY, L. S., SHIMOMURA, K.-I. The Walras core of an Economy and its limit theorem. University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6hp534w3, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara, 2004.
SHAPLEY, L. S., BURGIN, M. Enhanced Banzhaf power index and it’s mathematical properties. UCLA Economic Working Papers 797, UCLA Department of Economics, 2000.
SHAPLEY, L. S., PALAMARA, J. R. Control games and organizations. UCLA Economics Working Papers 795, UCLA Department of Economics, 2000.
SHAPLEY, L. S., PALAMARA, J. R. Simple games and and authority structure. UCLA Economics Working Papers 796, UCLA Department of Economics, 2000.
SHAPLEY, L. S., BAUCELLS, M. Multiperson utility. UCLA Economics Working Papers 779, UCLA Department of Economics, 1988.
LEVY, A., SHAPLEY, L. S. Individual and collective wage bargaining. UCLA Economics Working Papers 671, UCLA Department of Economics, 1992.
SHAPLEY, L. S. Kernels of replicated market games. UCLA Economics Working Papers 654, UCLA Department of Economics, 1992.
AUMANN, R. J., SHAPLEY, L. S. Long term competition-a game theoretic analysis. UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics, 1992.
LEVY, A., SHAPLEY, L. S. Individual and collective wage bargaining. UCLA Economics Working Papers 420, UCLA Department of Economics, 1986.
DUBEY, P., SHAPLEY, L. S. Totally balanced games arising from controlled programming problems. UCLA Economics Working Papers 262, UCLA Department of Economics, 1982.
DUBEY, P., SHAPLEY, L. S. Noncooperative Exchange with a continuum of traders. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 447, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, 1997.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SHUBIK, M. A theory of money and financial institutions. Part VI. The rate of interest, noncooperative equilibrium and bankrupcy. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 334, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, 1972.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SHUBIK, M. Competitive equilibrium and game theory solutions: Part I. The core and value. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 316, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, 1971.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SHUBIK, M. Price strategy oligopoly with product variation. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 233, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, 1967.
SHAPLEY, L. S., SHUBIK, M. Ownership and the production function. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 167, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, 1964.
SHAPLEY, L. S. Stochastic games. Proceedings of National Academy of Science, vol. 39, p. 1095 – 1100, 1953.