Alvin Eliot Roth

Profesor Alvin Eliot „Al“ Roth se narodil 18. prosince 1951 v Queens, New York. Studoval na Columbia University, kde se zabýval operačním výzkumem, přešel na Stanford University a roku 1974 získává PhD v oboru operačního výzkumu. Odchází přednášet na University of Illinois, poté na University of Pittsburgh a vrací se na Stanford a jako profesor emeritus přednáší na Harvard University.

Roth se zabýval zejména teorií her, návrhem trhů a experimentální ekonomikou. Ve svých pracech navazuje na svého kolegu Shapleyho sérií empirických studií, pomáhajících k úpravám přiřazovacích postupů. Konkrétně například vypracoval nové postupy pro optimální přiřazení absolventů základních škol do škol středních s aplikací pro New York a Boston. A. E. Roth na základě práce Shapleyho a Galeho navrhl vhodný mechanismus výběru, algoritmus a podmínky zaručující úspěch. V praxi to tedy znamená nejen optimalizaci volby studentů a vylepšení systému přijímání studentů ke studiu na středních školách, ale i umisťování nových lékařů do nemocnic a tvorbu registru dárců ledvin a příjemců transplantace.

Alvin Roth je mj. členem American Academy of Arts and Sciences, působí v NBER, je členem Econometric Society.

Al Roth je ženatý a má dvě již dospělé děti – Aarona a Bena.

Knihy

Game theory in the tradition of Bob Wilson. Edited by P. Milgrom, A. E. Roth. Berkeley: Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002.

The handbook of experimental economics. Edited by J. H. Kagel, A. E. Roth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

ROTH, A. E., SOTOMAYOR, M. A. O. Two-Sided Matching. Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Edited by A. E. Roth. Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, 1988, 2005.

Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View. Edited by A. E. Roth. Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, 1987, 2005.

Game-Theoretic  Models of Bargaining. Edited by A. E. Roth. Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, 1985, 2005.

ROTH, A. E. Axiomatic models of bargaining. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems.  Springer-Verlag, 1979.

Články

ROTH, A. E. Marketplace institutions related to the timing of transactions: Reply to Priest. Journal of Labor Economics, 2012, vol. 30, no. 2, p. 479 – 494.

ASHLAGI, I., ROTH, A. E. New challenges in multihospital kidney exchange. American Economic Review, May 2012, vol. 102, no. 3, p. 354 – 359.

ROTH, A. E. Qué hemos aprendido del diseňo de mercados? El Trimeste Económico, 2011, vol. 0, no. 310, p. 359 – 314.

ERT, E., EREV, I., ROTH, A. E. A choice prediction competition for social preferences in simple extensive form games: an introduction. Games, July 2011, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 257 – 276.

WALLIS, C. B., KANNAN, P. S., ROTH, A. E., REES, M. A. Kidney paired donation. Nephrology, Dialysis, Transplantation, July 2011, vol. 26, no. 7, p. 2091 – 2099.

EREV, I., ERT, E., ROTH, A. E. A choice prediction competition for market entry games: an introduction. Games, May 2010, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 117 – 136.

LEIDER, S., ROTH, A. E. Kidneys for sale: Who disapproves, and why? American Journal of Transplantation, May 2010, vol. 10, p. 1221 – 1227.

NIEDERLE, M., ROTH, A. E. Market culture: How rules governing exploding offers affect market performance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Aug. 2009, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 199 – 219.

ABDULKADIROGLU, A., PATHAK, P. A., ROTH, A. E. Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences:  Redesigning the NYC high school match. American Economic Review, Dec. 2009, vol. 99, no. 5, p. 1954 – 1978.

EREV, I., ROTH, A. E., SLONIM, R., BARRON, G. Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games. Economic Theory, Oct. 2007, vol. 33, no. 1, p. 29 – 51.

OCKENFELS, A., ROTH, A. E. Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, vol. 55, no. 2, p. 297 – 320.

ASKER, J., GROSSKOPF, B., McKINNEY, N., NIEDERLE, M., ROTH, A. E. Teaching auction strategy using experiments administered via the internet. Journal of Economic Education, 2004, vol. 35, no. 4, p. 330 – 342.

KATOK, E., ROTH, A. E. Auctions of homogenous goods with increasing returns: Experimental comparison of alternative „Dutch“ auctions. Management Science, Aug. 2004, vol. 50, no. 8, p. 330 – 342.

COOPER, D., FELTOVICH, N., ROTH, A. E. ZWICK, R. Relative versus absolute speed of adjustment in strategic environments: Responder behavior in ultimatum games. Experimentral Economics, Oct. 2003, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 181 – 207.

GNEEZY, U., HARUVY, E., ROTH, A. E. Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game. Games and Economic Behavior, Nov. 2003, vol. 45, no. 2, p. 347 – 368.

ROTH, A. E. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica, July 2002, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 1341 – 1378.

EREV, I., ROTH, A. E., SLONIM, R. L., BARRON, G. Predictive value and the usefullness of game theoretic models. International Journal of Forecasting, 2002, vol. 18, no. 3, p. 359 – 368.

KAGEL, J. H., ROTH, A. E. The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratoratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Febr. 2000, vol. 115, no. 1, p. 201 – 235.

EREV, I., BEREBY-MEYER, Y., ROTH, A. E. The effect of adding a constant to all payoffs: experimental investigation, and implications for reinforcement learning models. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, May 1999, vol. 39, no. 1, p. 111 – 128.

ROTH, A. E., ROTHBLUM, U. G. Truncation strategies in matching markets-in search of advice for participants. Econometrica, Jan. 1999, vol. 67, no. 1, p. 21 – 44.

SLONIM, R., ROTH, A. E. Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak Republic. Econometrica, May 1998, vol. 66, no. 3, p. 569 – 596.

EREV, I., ROTH, A. E. Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. American Economic Review, Sept. 1998, vol. 88, no. 4, p. 848 – 881.

ROTH, A. E., XING, X. Turnaround time and bottlenecks in market clearing: Decentralized matching in the market for clinical psychologists. Journal of Political Economy, Apr. 1997, vol. 105, no. 2, p. 284 – 329.

BLUM, Y., ROTH, A. E., ROTHBLUM, U. G. Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets. Journal of Economic Theory, Oct. 1997, vol. 76, no. 2, p. 362 – 411.

ROTH, A. E. POSTLEWAITE, A. Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Aug. 1977, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 131 – 137.

ROTH, A. E., EREV, I. Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 164 – 212.

ROTH, A. E. Lets keep the con out of experimental econ.: A methodological note. Empirical Economics, 1994, vol. 19, no. 2, p. 279 – 289.

ROTH, A. E., XING, X. Jumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions. American Economic Review, Sept. 1994, vol. 84, no. 4, p. 992 – 1044.

ROTH, A. E. The early history of experimental economics. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Sept. 1993, vol. 15, no. 02, p. 184 – 209.

KAGEL, J. H., ROTH, A. E. Theory and misbehavior in first-price auctions: Comment. American Economic Review, Dec. 1992, vol. 82, no. 5, p. 1379 – 1391.

ROTH, A. E. A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. American Economic Review, June 1991, vol. 81, no. 3, p. 415 – 440.

ROTH, A. E. Game theory as a part of empirical economics. Economic Journal, Jan. 1991, vol. 101, no. 404, p. 107 – 114.

MONGELL, S., ROTH, A. E. Sorority rush as a two-sided matching mechanism. American Economic Review, June 1991, vol. 81, no. 3, p. 441 – 464.

ROTH, A. E. VANDE VATE, J. H. Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms. Economic Theory, Jan. 1991, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 31 – 44.

ROTH, A. E., VANDE VATE, J. H. Random paths to stability in two-sided matching. Econometrica, Nov. 1990, vol. 58, no. 6, p. 559 – 570.

ROTH, A. E. SOTOMAYOR, M. The college admissions problém revisited. Econometrica, May 1989, vol. 57, no. 3, p. 559 – 570.

ROTH, A. E. Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, June 1989, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 191 – 209.

ROTH, A. E. Risk aversion and the relationship between Nash’s solution and subgame perfect equilibrium of sequential bargaining. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Dec. 1989, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 353 – 365.

ROTH, A. E. Laboratory experimentation in economics: A methodological overview. Economic Journal, Dec. 1988, vol. 98, no. 393, p. 974 – 1031.

ROTH, A. E., SOTOMAYOR, M. Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets. Journal of Economic Theory, June 1988, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 85 – 101.

ROTH, A. E., MURNIGHAN, J. K., SCHOUMAKER, F. The deadline effect in bargaining: Some experimental evidence. American Economic Review, Sept. 1988, vol. 78, no. 4, p. 806 – 823.

ROTH, A. E. On the allocation of residents to rural hospitals: A general property of two-sided matching markets. Econometrica, March 1986, vol. 54, no. 2, p. 425 – 427.

MONGELL, S. J., ROTH, A. E. A note on job matching with budget constraints. Economic Letters, 1986, vol. 21, no. 2, p. 135 – 138.

ROTH, A. E. On the non-transferable utility value: A reply (Values for games without sidepayments: Some difficulties with current concepts). Econometrica, July 1986, vol. 54, no. 4, p. 981 – 984.

ROTH, A. E. Laboratory experimentation in economics. Economics and Philosophy, Oct. 1986, vol. 2, no. 02, p. 245 – 273.

ROTH, A. E. Common and conflicting interests in two-sided matching markets. European Economic Review, Febr. 1985, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 75 – 96.

ROTH, A. E. The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. Journal of Economic Theory, Aug. 1985, vol. 36, no. 2, p. 277 – 288.

ROTH, A. E. A note on risk aversion in a perfect equilibrium model of bargaining. Econometrica, Jan. 1985, vol. 53, no. 1, p. 207 – 211.

ROTH, A. E. Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem. Journal of Economic Theory, Dec. 1984, vol. 34, no. 2, p. 383 – 387.

ROTH, A. E. Stability and polarization of interests in job matching. Econometrica, Jan. 1984, vol. 52, no. 1, p. 47 – 57.

ROTH, A. E., SCHOUMAKER, F. Note — Subjective probability and the theory of games: Some further comments. Management Science, Nov. 1983, vol. 29, no. 11, p. 1337 – 1340.

ROTH, A. E., SCHOUMAKER, F. Expectations and reputations in bargaining: An experimental study. American Economic Review, June 1983, vol. 73, no. 3, p. 362 – 372.

ROTH, A. E., MALOUF, M. W. K. Scale changes and shared information in bargaining: An experimental study. Mathematical Social Sciences, Sept. 1982, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 157 – 177.

ROTH, A. E. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economic Letters, 1982, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 127 – 132.

ROTH, A. E., ROTHBLUM, U. G. Risk aversion and Nash’s solution for bargaining games with risky outcomes. Econometrica, May 1982, vol. 50, no. 3, p. 353 – 365.

DeBROCK, L. M., ROTH, A. E. Strike two: Labor-management negotiations in major league baseball. Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn 1981, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 413 – 425.

ROTH, A. E., MALOUF, M. W. K., MURNIGHAN, J. K. Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, June 1981, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 153 – 177.

ROTH, A. E. Values for games without sidepayments: Some difficulties with current concepts. Economentrica, March 1980, vol. 48, no. 2, p. 457 – 465.

ROTH, A. E. Proportional solutions to the bargaining problem. Econometrica, May 1979, vol. 47, no. 3, p. 775 – 777.

ROTH, A. E. The Nash solution and the utility of bargaining. Econometrica, May 1978, vol. 43, no. 3, p. 587 – 594.

ROTH, A. E. The Shapley value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Econometrica, Apr. 1977, vol. 45, no. 3, p. 657 – 664.

ROTH, A. E., POSLEWAITE, A. Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Aug. 1977, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 131 – 137.

MURNIGHAN, J. K., ROTH, A. E. The effects of communication and information availability in an experimental study of a three-person game. Management Science, Aug. 1977, vol. 23, no. 12, p. 1336 – 1348.

ROTH, A. E. Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem. Journal of Economic Theory, Dec. 1977, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 247 – 251.

ROTH, A. E. Utility functions for simple games. Journal of Economic Theory, Dec. 1977, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 481 – 489.

Working papers, proceedings, přednášky, aj.

ASHLAGI, I., GAMARNIK, D., REES, M. A., ROTH, A. E. The need for (long) chains in kidney exchange. NBER Working Papers 18202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2012.

ASHLAGI, I., ROTH, A. E. Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange. NBER Working Papers 16720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2011.

KESSLER, J. B., ROTH, A. E. Organ allocation policy and the decision to donate. NBER Working Papers 17324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2011.

ROTH, A. E. Marketplace institutions related to the timing transactions. NBER Working Papers 16556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2010.

COLES, P. A., CAWLEY, J., LEVINE, P. B., ROTH, A. E., SIEGFRIED, J. J., NIEDERLE, M. The job market for new economists: A market design perspective. Scholarly Articles 5343168, Harvard University Department of Economics, 2010.

KOJIMA, F., PATHAK, P. A., ROTH, A. E. Matching with couples: Stability and incentives in large markets. NBER Working Papers 16028, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2010.

ROTH, A. E., LEIDER, S. Kidneys for sale: Who disapproves, and why? Scholarly Articles 5128483, Harvard University Department of Economics, 2010.

ABDULKADIROGLU, A., PATKAK, P. A., ROTH, A. E. Strategy-proofness vs. efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 122247000000002108, David K. Levine, 2009.

NIEDERLE, M., ROTH, A. E., UNVER, U. Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply: An experimental investigation. NBER Working Papers 15006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2009.

HAU, R., HERTWIG, R., ROTH, A. E., STEWART, T., WEST, R., LEBIERE, C., EREV, I., ERT, E., HARUVY, E., HERZOG, S. A choice prediction competition: Choices from experience and from description. Scholarly Articles 5343169, Harvard University Department of Economics, 2009.

NIEDERLE, M., ROTH, A. E. The effects of a centralized clearinghouse on job placement, wages, and hiring practices. NBER Working Papers 13529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2007.

ROTH, A. E. Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions. NBER Working Papers 13225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2007.

AVERY, C., JOLLS, C., POSNER, R., ROTH, A. E. The new market for federal judical law clerks. NBER Working Papers 13213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2007.

UNVER, M. U., SONMEZ, T., ROTH, A. E. Efficient kidney exchange:  Coincidence of wants in a market with compatibility-based preferences. Scholarly Articles 2562809, Harvard University Department of Economics, 2007.

ROTH, A. E., NIEDERLE, M. Making markets thick: Designing rules for offers and acceptace. Levine’s Bibliography 843644000000000142, UCLA Department of Economics, 2007.

ROTH, A. E. What have we learned from market design? NBER Working Papers 13530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2007.

ROTH, A. E., BEREBY-MEYER, Y. The speed of learning in noisy games: Partial reinforcement and the sustainability of cooperation. Scholarly Articles 2579650, Harvard University Department of Economics, 2006.

ROTH, A. E. Repugnance as a constraint on markets. NBER Working Papers 12702, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2006.

ABDULKADIROGLU, A., PATHAK, P. A., ROTH, A. E., SONMEZ, T. Changing the Boston school choice mechanism. Boston College Working Papers in Economics 639, Boston College Department of Economics, 2006.

UNVER, M. U., SONMEZ, T., ROTH, A. E. Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in a structured market. Working Papers 263, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, 2005.

ROTH, A. E., NIEDERLE, M. The gastroenterology fellowship market: should there be a match? Scholarly Articles 2562766, Harvard University Department of Economics, 2005.

GROSSKOPF, B., ROTH, A. E. If you are offered the right of firs refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design. Levine’s Bibliography 122247000000001017, UCLA Department of Economics, 2005.

ROTH, A. E., UNVER, M. U., SONMEZ, T. A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England. Scholarly Articles 2562810, Harvard University Department of Economics, 2005.

SONMEZ, T., PATHAK, P. A., ABDULKADIROGLU, A., ROTH, A. E. The Boston public school match. Scholarly Articles 2562764, Harvard University Department of Economics, 2005.

PATHAK, P. A., ABDULKADIROGLU, A., ROTH, A. E. The New York City high school match. Scholarly Articles 2562765, Harvard University Department of Economics, 2005.

NIEDERLE, M., ROTH, A. E. Market culture: How norms governing exploding offers affect market performance. Levine’s Bibliography 12224700000000207, UCLA Department of Economics, 2004.

UNVER, M. U., ROTH, A. E. Unravelling yields inefficient matching: Evidence from post-season college football bowls. Working Papers 259, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, 2004.

HARUVY, E., ROTH, A. E., UNVER, M. U. The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market.  Experimental 0404001, EconWPA, 2004.

ROTH, A. E., SONMEZ, T., UNVER, M. U. Pairwise kidney exchange. Levine’s Bibliography 122247000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics, 2004.

ROTH, A. E., SONMEZ, T., UNVER, M. U. Kidney exchange.  Game Theory and Information 0308002, EconWPA, 2003.

McKINNEY, C. N., NIEDERLE, M., ROTH, A. E. The collapse of a medical clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare). NBER Working Papers 9467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2003.

NIEDERLE, M., ROTH, A. E. Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 506439000000000428, David K. Levine, 2003.

OCKENFELS, A., ROTH, A. E. Late and multiple bidding in second price internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction. CESifo Working Paper Series 992, CESifo Group Munich, 2003.

ARIELY, D., OCKENFELS, A., ROTH, A. E. An experimental analysis of ending rules in internet auctions. Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-47, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, 2002.

ROTH, A. E., OCKENFELS, A. Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the internet. Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, 2002.

NIEDERLE, M., ROTH, A. E. Unravelling reduces the scope of an entry level labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match. NBER Working Papers 8616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2001.

POSNER, R. A., AVERY, C., JOLLS, C., ROTH, A. E. The market for federal judicial law clerks. Scholarly Articles 2623748, Harvard University Department of Economics, 2001.

OCKENFELS, A., ROTH, A. E. The timing of bids in internet auctions: Market design, bidder behavior, and artifical agents. Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-33, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, 2001.

ROTH, A. E., OCKENFELS, A. Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Theory and evidence from a natural experiment on the internet. NBER Working Papers 7729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2000.

ROTH, A. E., PERANSON, E. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1999.

SLONIM, R., ROTH, A. E. Learning in high stakes ultimatum and market games. An experiment in the Slovak Republic. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 1718, David K. Levine, 1998.

ROTH, A. E., EREV, I. Learning in extensive form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate run. Levine’s  Working Paper Archive 387, David K. Levine, 1995.

PRASNIKAR, V., ROTH, A. E. Consideration of fairness and strategy: experimental data from sequential games. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 451, David K. Levine, 1992.

ROTH, A. E., PRASNIKAR, V., OKUNO-FUJIWARA, M., ZAMIR, S. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An experimental study. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 344, David K. Levine, 1991.

OCHS, J., ROTH, A. E. An experimental study of sequential bargaining. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 331, David K. Levine, 1989.

MURNIGHAN, J. K., ROTH, A. E., SCHOUMAKER, F. Risk aversion and bargaining: Some preliminary results. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 1493, David K. Levine, 1987.

MURNIGHAN, J. K., ROTH, A. E. SCHOUMAKER, F. Risk aversion in bargaining: An experimental strudy. Cahiers de recherche 8536, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, 1985.

ROTH, A. E. Toward a theory of bargaining: an experimental study in economics. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 1629, David K. Levine, 1983.

ROTH, A. E., MURNIGHAN, J. K. The role of information in bargaining: an experimental study. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 1631, David K. Levine, 1982.

ROTH, A. E. Axiomatic models of bargaining. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 12247000000002376, David K. Levine, 1979.

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Alvin Eliot Roth